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Abstract 
 
Sovereign Debt Default and Bank Risk in China 
By 
Dong (Ryan) Chen 
 
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, sovereign default risk has become an 
important issue in Europe, as many Eurozone countries such as Greek and Portugal 
fell into serious debt problems. The sovereign default problem in these countries not 
only negatively impacts the overall economy of the countries, but also slows down the 
recovery process or even endangers the financial system of the Eurozone as a whole. 
 
Some researchers have studied the sovereign default problem in Eurozone countries. 
For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) tested the relationship between government 
debt and bank crisis, and found a strong link between them. In addition, Gennaioli, 
Martin and Rossi (2014) claimed that public default weakens the balance sheets of 
banks which hold public bonds. Further Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) confirmed that 
the run-up in debts acceleration is an important signal of a bank crisis. 
 
The debt issue is not confined to Eurozone countries. Based on JP Morgan reports, at 
the end of 2012, the total Chinese government debt (central and local government 
III 
 
debts) in terms of GDP ratio was 187%, reaching 282% in 2015. This high 
government debt level can potentially endanger the financial stability of China and its 
overall economy. In addition, it may result in a bank crisis in China. This study tests a 
potential sovereign debt problem and bank risk in China’s financial market. This 
includes the origin of the sovereign debt problem (what factors contribute to 
sovereign default), the negative impact of sovereign debt issues (for example the 
impact on economic growth and the financial system) and the interaction of sovereign 
debt and bank sectors (that sovereign default can negatively impact the banking 
system. On the other hand, banking factors also impact the sovereign debt problem). 
 
This study tested the sovereign debt dynamics of China. The results confirmed a 
sovereign debt problem in China since 2009, which could be the result of the massive 
government expenditure since 2008. Secondly, this study estimated the sovereign risk 
of China based on macroeconomic fundamentals. The results found significant impact 
of macroeconomic fundamentals (debt burden, government revenue, debt interest rate, 
economic growth and inflation) on the sovereign risk in China. This provides a 
potential mechanism for the Chinese government to make concerted decisions to 
control the sovereign debt risk. Finally, this study investigated the impact of sovereign 
risk on bank risk in China. The results showed strong link between sovereign risk and 
bank risk especially for government-owned banks in China, which warn banks and 
government of China to pay attention to the spillover effect between sovereign risk 
and bank risk. 
Keywords: Sovereign debt, China, Financial system, Risk 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Since the central bank of Iceland crashed in October 2008, the sovereign debt problem 
has become a serious problem in the global financial system. In fact, recent sovereign 
debt problems have occurred in many Eurozone countries, such as Greece and 
Portugal, and have slowed down the economy in the Eurozone and endangered the 
financial system, not only in Europe but globally. 
 
For example, the sovereign debt problems in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and 
Spain (PIIGS) significantly impact the whole Eurozone economy negatively, and no 
single member country can be immune from this sovereign debt crisis, because of the 
unified currency and highly linked market via trade in the Eurozone countries. When 
one member suffers a sovereign debt issue, the rest of the members have to pay for the 
consequences (Lane, 2012). The Eurozone members have paid more than 320 billion 
U.S. dollars to help Greece’s sovereign debt (see Table 1.1) during the recent 
European sovereign debt crisis. 
 
In the case of Greece, the first two bailout packages made by Eurozone member states 
and the IMF were worth 110 billion Euros and 164 billion Euros in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively(Spiegel, 2013) (see Table 1.1). However, according to the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) report (cited by Spiegel, 2013), due to the recent 
sovereign rating and the global economy not recovering rapidly (according to World 
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Bank data, the global growth rate decreased from 4.3% in 2010 to 2.5% in 2015), 
Greece was not able to raise enough money by selling sovereign debt in the open 
market in 2014 to keep the country from a sovereign default. As a result, a third 
bailout (USD96 billion) was made in 2015. Differently from the last two bailouts, the 
IMF was not involved in the third bailout package (A third bailout gets the green light, 
2015).In spite of the third bailout, the Eurozone financial ministers agreed to extend 
the repayment period and cap the interest rate for the first two bailouts (Greece bailout: 
Eurozone deal unlocks 10.3bn euro, 2016). 
 
The bailouts in Greece significantly impact the other Eurozone countries and the 
credit risk may spillover to other EU members such as Portugal, Italy, and Spain. 
According to Augustin, Boustanifar, Breckenfelder and Schnitzler (2016), the 
spillover effects of the credit risk spread from Greece to the whole Eurozone. The 
authors’ study found a strong link between sovereign risks in Greece and credit risks 
in the EU and the authors believed that after the first bailout, a ten percent increase in 
sovereign credit risk in Greece would increase the corporate credit risk in the 
Eurozone by 1.1 percent. 
 
Table 1.1 Bailout Packages to Greece in U.S. dollars 
From Eurozone countries (billion) From IMF (billion) Total (billion) 
Package one (2010) 
80 30 110 
Package two (2012) 
145 19 164 
Package three (2015) 
96 0 96 
Source: German Finance Ministry, 2016 
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Sovereign risk can potentially spread to financial institutions, particularly banks when 
the value of collaterals that the banks hold in sovereign debt is reduced (Babecky et 
al., 2012). Babecky et al. (2012) investigated bank, debt and currency risks based on 
quarterly data in 40 advanced countries from 1970 to 2010 and found that sovereign 
risk impacts bank risk through fundamentals such as GDP growth and credit risk. In 
addition, sovereign defaults directly harm the value of the government bonds and 
loans that banks’ hold, which significantly impacts banks’ risk. This is true for banks 
with large numbers of government bonds. For example, Angeloni and Wolff (2012) 
investigated the bank stock market value dynamics and found that banks’ market 
performances were strongly affected by the sovereign debt holdings of Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (PIIGS) during the European debt crisis period. For 
example, the major drop in the banks’ stock market value in July to October 2011 was 
attributed to the Greek debt holdings; Italian and Irish sovereign exposures 
significantly impacted the banks’ performances in October to December 2011. As a 
result, the authors believe there is a strong linkage between sovereign debt risk and 
bank performance. When the sovereign debt level is high, the default risk of 
government loans will be questioned; the sovereign risk may cause panic selling and 
devalue government bonds, which significantly impact the asset value of the banks 
that hold a large amount of government debts (Kiyotaki & Moore, 2005). Similarly, 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003) studied the contagious and financial linkages 
between financial sectors such as sovereign debt and bank sector and found that 
sovereign risk can significantly impact bank risk. The authors argue that negative 
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shocks in one market can directly impact the collateral values and cash flows 
associated with securities in other markets such as the bank sector. 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) tested the relationship between debt and bank crises of 
the world’s financial markets from 1970 to 2009 and confirmed that sovereign debt 
and bank crisis tend to occur together. Their study suggests that once the government 
decides to roll over the sovereign debt, the cash flow of these banks will be 
significantly affected. The authors further emphasized that even if banks do not hold 
much government debt, the sovereign ceiling may make the banks’ offshore 
borrowing quite costly or even impossible. As a consequence, a sovereign debt crisis 
can easily lead to a bank crisis (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). Similarly, 
Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2011) investigated the impact of sovereign debt risk on 
bank risk during the 2010 European debt crisis. The authors observed a 30% to 50% 
haircut on the sovereign debt asset value loss for banks which held heavy sovereign 
debt of PIIGS countries. The authors concluded that sovereign default potentially 
decreases banks’ performance. 
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1.2Background 
Table 1.2 Total Central Government Debts of China 
 Government debts (Trillion RMB) 
2006 5.37 
2007 5.65 
2008 7.49 
2009 7.12 
2010 8.19 
2011 16.98 
2012 15.67 
2013 15.29 
2014 14.26 
2015 16.85 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016 
 
The government debts of China have increased dramatically in the last ten years (see 
Table 1.2); resulting from China issuing a lot of government debts in recent years, 
especially after the global financial crisis in 2008. For example, in the State Council 
Standing Committee meeting on the 9th of November 2008, the Chinese Government 
implemented an RMB4 trillion economic stimulus package in transportation and 
infrastructure areas (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). This stimulus package is 
equivalent to USD586 billion; however, in the package, the central government only 
provided RMB1180 billion (USD172 billion) leaving local governments and banks to 
fund the rest (Dyer, 2008). Owing to the cash shortages (there is a large gap between 
tax revenues and expenditure to meet the 4 trillion stimulus plan), local governments 
such as those of Sichuan and Jiangsu, hold massive debtstotallingRMB64.51 billion 
and RMB770.6 billion, respectively (Zhang, 2013a). According to a JP Morgan report 
in 2013, China’s total debt to GDP ratio was 187% at the end of 2012; this reached282% 
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in 2015. This ratio only numbered 105% in 2000. The rapid rise in China’s 
government debt ratio implies a higher probability of a debt crisis occurring in China. 
According to The Economist (2016), debt expanded twice as fast as the economy in 
China and the massive growth of debt created liquidity and bank risks. For example, 
in 2015, USD65 billion worth of bank loans turned bad and USD600 billion in capital 
has left China. These suggest a large negative impact of debt to GDP ratio increasing 
in China. Similarly, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) suggested that borrowing surges 
(massive amounts of borrowing taking place in a short period) potentially signal that a 
crisis is not too far away. The authors studied total government debt in emerging 
countries from 1970 to 2009 and confirmed that a large increase in the debt to GDP 
ratio was one of the determinants of the sovereign crisis. Researchers from the World 
Bank investigated the sovereign risk based on a data set of 101 countries from 1980 to 
2008 and found that debt to GDP is one the important determinants of sovereign risk. 
The authors believe that the threshold level of the debt-GDP ratio is around 77%; 
once the ratio exceeds 77%, a 1% increase in the debt-GDP ratio will decrease real 
economic growth by 0.02%, which negatively impacts the sovereign risk (Caner, 
Grennes & Koebler-Geib, 2010). Therefore, the high debt-GDP ratio potentially can 
lead to a sovereign risk problem in China. 
 
It is interesting that the sovereign debt ratio is very high in China when the country is 
considered one of the richest countries in the world. China’s foreign exchange 
reserves totalled USD3.5 trillion in June 2013, and this jumped to 3.66 trillion US 
dollars in just three months at the end of September (Silk, 2013).By the end of 
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January 2016, China’s foreign exchange reserves reached USD3.23 trillion. The rapid 
increase started when China opened up to outside markets in the 1990s. Owing to the 
comparative advantage in prices, the large growth of foreign exchange reserves is 
attributed to success in China’s exports (Yueh, 2013).The author believes that the 
comparative price advantage of “made in China” products creates a large demand for 
China’s manufactured goods, which strongly increases the exports that far exceed the 
imports. This generates an instant cash inflow in foreign currency which significantly 
increases the foreign exchange reserves in China (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1 Foreign Exchange Reserves in China 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016 
 
However, holding a large amount of foreign currency is not helping China to avoid its 
debt problems. The 2008 US sub-prime loan crisis negatively impacted global 
markets, and the failure of many investment banks in Wall Street and the bailout of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac caused creditors to lose confidence and create panic sale 
behaviour, which harmed the financial system globally. This global recession 
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decreased the international trade globally, which significantly impacted China’s 
exports. For example Table 1.3 shows that the exports in China experienced a 
significant decrease from the beginning of 2009, and net exports decreased by 
16%.The decrease in exports reduced the economic growth in China and, in order to 
sustain growth in the economy, a massive stimulus plan was implemented by the 
Chinese government in 2008. However, this plan sunk RMB40 billion into projects 
that generated little return such as the high-speed rail project (Hinds, 2013). As a 
result, about three-quarters of the government debts that matured at the end of 2012 
could not be paid so China’s banks issued a 428 billion US dollars bailout via a 
massive rollover scheme to avert local government defaults (Rabinovitch, 2013). 
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Table 1.3 China’s Export Dynamics 2008-2009 
 Export Growth (%) Net Growth (%) 
1/2008 26.7 26.6 
2/2008 6.5 16.8 
3/2008 30.6 21.4 
4/2008 21.8 21.5 
5/2008 28.1 22.9 
6/2008 17.6 21.8 
7/2008 26.9 22.6 
8/2008 21.1 22.4 
9/2008 21.5 22.2 
10/2008 19.2 21.9 
11/2008 -2.2 19.3 
12/2008 -2.8 17.2 
1/2009 -17.5 -17.5 
2/2009 -25.7 -21.1 
3/2009 -17.1 -19.7 
4/2009 -22.6 -20.5 
5/2009 -26.4 -21.8 
6/2009 -21.4 -21.8 
7/2009 -23 -22 
8/2009 -23.4 -22.2 
9/2009 -15.2 -21.3 
10/2009 -13.8 -20.5 
11/2009 -1.2 -18.8 
12/2009 17.7 -16 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010 
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1.3Research problem statement 
 
The debt problem generated a serious liquidity problem in China owing to a large 
amount of government debt rollover. For example, the interbank overnight lending 
rate (SHIBOR) reached 13.44% in June 2013; at the same time, the interbank 
overnight repo rate exploded to 25%, which suggests that China’s interbank market 
nearly froze in mid-2013 due to a money shortage (Zhang, 2013b).Consequently, 
large numbers of banks temporarily stopped lending to businesses and individuals 
from June to mid-July 2013 (Li, 2013). Further, many companies received requests 
about tightening loan repayment schedules and a number of banks (such as the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the China Minsheng Bank Co., Ltd) 
even refused to renew any existing loans (Zhang & Han, 2013). This implied that the 
liquidity problem was potentially spreading from the financial sector to the real 
economy. 
 
Owing to the large amount of foreign exchange reserves, an option available to 
China’s government is to raise money from the exchange market by selling the 
foreign currencies. By doing so, the government would be able to repay the sovereign 
debt in order to release the pressure of the money shortage in the financial market. 
However, such action would result in a series of negative consequences. Selling 
foreign exchange reserves will increase the exchange rate of the RMB against other 
currencies, which raises the prices of products made in China. This will impact 
China’s export negatively (Thorbecke, 2011), which could potentially damage the 
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Similarly, increase in money supply – M2 is also not a smart choice either as the 
increase in the money supply will generate a higher inflation rate. Rajkumar (2011) 
tested the long run relationship between money supply and inflation in India from 
1935 to 2009 and found that money supply has major effects on growth in the price 
levels, which implies that an increase in the money supply may lead to an increase in 
inflation. Similarly, Lavern, Wayne and Gooboon (2006) studied the impact of money 
supply on inflation and public debt in 71 countries from 1963 to 2004 and concluded 
there is a strong link between money supply and inflation. Banks’ collateral would be 
devalued with increasing inflation. As a result, increase money supply may potentially 
lead to a bank crisis in China. 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether a sovereign debt problem exists in 
China and the consequences and impacts of such debt on the country’s economy. 
 
1.4 Research objectives: 
 
The objectives of this study are: 
 To investigate whether a sovereign debt problem is occurring in China 
 
 To examine the determinants of China’s sovereign debt risk 
 
 To study the link between the bank risk and sovereign debt risk in China’s 
financial market 
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1.5 Research contributions 
 
First, since the outbreak of the sovereign crisis in Europe, many researchers have paid 
attention to the government debt issue in Europe. For example Lane (2012) claimed 
that the European debt crisis was due to the high debt to GDP ratio. Cottarelli (2012) 
found that, besides the debt burden, the unified currency policy in the Eurozone was 
another important contribution to the Eurozone debt crisis. Cui (2012) further 
explained that the unified monetary policy in the EU switches off the opportunities for 
governments to use monetary tools to adjust the respective country’s economy, which 
may cause the government policies to be ineffective and lead to the Eurozone debt 
crisis. Mody and Sandri (2012) reported that the Eurozone debt crisis significantly 
impacted the banking sector in the EU and the losses (30%-50% haircuts on the 
sovereign debt assets value) from bad loans of EU banks increased during the debt 
crisis period. However, there are limited empirical studies in international literature 
about the sovereign debt risk in China. As a result, one of the goals of this current 
study is to empirically test the potential sovereign debt risk and its determinants in 
China. 
 
Second, majority of the existing literature only focus on the impact of debt burden and 
debt level on sovereign debt risk due to the significant increase in sovereign debts in 
China since 2008 (see Hou et al., 2012; Fan & Lv, 2012 and Li, 2012). Hou et al. 
(2012) focused on the imbalance between the investment and consumption of China 
which suggests an unhealthy economic condition exists in China (see Section 2.7). 
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Fan & Lv (2012) and Li (2012) discussed the increasingly large amounts of central 
and local government loans in China which may far exceed the debt affordability of 
Chinese governments (see Section 2.6).However, other economic fundamentals such 
as debt affordability and debt interest rate also impact the sovereign debt risk (see 
Cole and Kehoe, 1996; Fuertes & Kalotychou, 2007 and Yue, 2010).For example, Yue 
(2010) studied the sovereign default and debt renegotiation for emerging countries in 
Latin America and found that the debt interest rate significantly increases the cost of 
debt which may lead to sovereign default. Further, Fuertes and Kalotychou (2007) 
claimed that debt affordability is one of the important determinations of a sovereign 
debt crisis based on the study of 75 emerging countries from 1984 to 2000. This is due 
to debt affordability (debt-revenue ratio) which shows the ability of a government to 
repay loans. As a result, the current study will focus on the impacts of economic 
fundamentals including not only GDP, government debts, and debt burden but also 
debt affordability and the interest rate on the sovereign debt risk. 
 
Third, most of the literature investigates the foreign currency government debt default 
such as 1980s Latin American debt crisis and 2010 European debt crisis. However, 
there are limited empirical studies on sovereign debt risk in a country where domestic 
debt almost occupies the total government debts; the domestic sovereign debt risk 
seems to be ignored in the international literature. Our study contributes to the 
literature in investigating sovereign debt risk in a country without any foreign 
currency sovereign debt problem (the extremely small proportion of foreign-total 
sovereign debt ratio, <1%, and the amount of foreign reserves in China far exceeds 
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the amount of foreign currency government debt). In addition, the S&P sovereign 
ratings is one of the indicators that has been widely used to study sovereign debt risk 
in a country; however, S&P sovereign ratings is normally used to determine foreign 
currency sovereign debt risk in the literature. This study attempts to test the suitability 
of using S&P sovereign ratings in determining government domestic debt risk in 
China. 
 
Forth, extant of the literature has widely addressed the impact of a sovereign debt 
problem on a country’s financial sector such as the banking system. According to 
Arteta and Hale (2008), sovereign debt risk will significantly impact the banks 
regardless of whether the banks hold a large amount of sovereign debts (also see 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2011) provided similar 
results in studying the relationship between bank risk and sovereign risk during the 
current Eurozone debt crisis. The authors observed a 30% to 50% haircut on the 
sovereign debt asset value loss for banks that held heavy sovereign debt of PIIGS 
countries, which suggests the strong link between sovereign risk and bank 
performance. However, the sovereign debt market and banking system in China are 
very different compared with other countries, such as European countries, that been 
studied widely. First, different from the European countries and many other countries 
which have a relative low share of government bonds held by banks, more than 65% 
of the Chinese government debt is purchased by Chinese commercial banks (see 
Figure 1.3). Second, there is a limited number of foreign commercial banks operate in 
China, and there are many restrictions on the foreign commercial banks’ spending in 
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concludes the research findings and discusses policy implications, limitations, and 
recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) define the debt crisis as an outright default, repudiation or 
restructuring of debt that causes a significant decrease in the credit supply. A debt 
crisis is potentially accompanied by a liquidity crisis, currency crisis (Arteta & Hale, 
2008) and bank crisis (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). According to Arteta and Hale 
(2008), a debt crisis exhibits a negative sign in the capital market, the lenders will 
certainly reconsider their current debt contract and further lending risk and as a result, 
capital will be extremely short in the open market which may lead to a liquidity crisis. 
The authors also claimed that a currency crisis may happen during a debt crisis 
because in a debt crisis foreign investors may decide to leave the market. These will 
significantly impact the exchange rate and devalue the country’s currency, which 
ultimately leads to a currency crisis. Banks which hold massive government bonds 
will experience losses if the country suffers from a debt crisis. This then leads to a 
banking crisis (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). For example, the 1980s’ Latin American 
debt crisis included the banking crisis and the currency (Peso) crisis, which will be 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
Historically, sovereign debt crises have occurred many times with most occurring in 
Latin American countries (for example Argentina and Mexico). For example, 
Argentina experienced sovereign debt defaults in 1982 and 2001 and restructured its 
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sovereign debts in 2005, 2007, and 2010 and Mexico faced similar sovereign debt 
difficulties in 1982 and 1994. The most serious sovereign debt crises, in terms of the 
deep and wide impacts of sovereign crises, occurred in Latin American and European 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain).  
 
This chapter discusses previous studies on debt crises primarily in Latin American and 
European countries. Section 2.1 introduces the definition of a debt crisis and the 
1980s’ Latin America debt crisis. Section 2.3 presents the literature on other debt 
crises in Latin America. Section 2.4 lists the studies on the 2010 European sovereign 
crisis and Section 2.5 discusses the impacts of sovereign debt risk. Section 2.6 
addresses the Asian experience of the debt issue and the current sovereign debt 
problem in China. 
 
2.2 Latin American debt crisis 
 
Latin American countries experienced a series of debt crises in the 1980s which 
started in August 1982, when Mexico first announced a default on its foreign debt 
payment. From that period, the contagion of Mexico’s debt default spread to other 
Latin American countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru, 
which were also unable to repay their debts. This contagion of the debt crisis spread 
fast because of the similar strategy of Latin American countries where they borrowed 
from developed countries to pay off old loans. If foreign creditors stop renewing the 
loans, this strategy will drive Latin American countries into a debt crisis. According to 
Marlene (1989), the total external debt that Latin American countries held numbered 
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420 billion US dollars and the interest on those loans totalled as high as 235 billion 
US dollars in 1982. The larger the amount of sovereign debts the higher the debt 
burden (debt-GDP ratio) and the lower the debt affordability (debt-revenue ratio), 
which increased the sovereign risk of Latin American countries. In addition, the high 
interest on sovereign loans lowered the ability of Latin American governments to 
repay loans. Consequently, the sovereign debts of Latin America became risky and as 
a result, the U.S. decided to stop their loan roll-over for Latin American countries. 
These led to the 1980s’ Latin American debt crisis. 
 
According to Kaminsky and Pereira’s (1996) study, after the onset of the debt crisis, 
the Latin American countries experienced a hard time, known as the “lost decade”. 
The authors’ data showed that the 1980s’ Latin American debt crisis resulted in a 
decrease in the average economic growth of the region from 6 percent in the 1970s to 
1.8 percent in the 1980s. The significant drop in economic growth was accompanied 
by a dramatic rise in inflation. The “lost decade” for Latin American countries was 
due to a dramatic drop in economic growth in the 1980s. For example, according to 
Levy-Livermore’s (1995) study, during the first two years of the 1982 Latin American 
debt crisis (1982-1983), the average economic growth of Latin American countries 
has decreased by 16 percent every year (see Table 2.1). In Table 2.1, we can clearly 
see that the economic growth of these countries experienced a major decrease from 
1982 to 1985 while the external debts exhibited an increasing trend during the whole 
period (1971-1987). Therefore, Bertola and Ocampo (2012) believe that the 1980s’ 
Latin American debt crisis is because of the imbalance of international trade which 
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leads to increasing external debts and the government being unable to afford the 
interest. 
 
Table 2.1 Total External Debt and Economic Growth Rate in Latin America 1971-1988 
Year Total external debt in 1980 US dollars Economic growth rate 
1971 60.6 billion 7% 
1972 69.7 billion 8.2% 
1973 77.2 billion 19.4% 
1974 92.6 billion 21.1% 
1975 101.5 billion -2% 
1976 117.9 billion 5% 
1977 166.9 billion 0.1% 
1978 191.9 billion 8.6% 
1979 214.5 billion 9.6% 
1980 242.7 billion 9.3% 
1981 270.5 billion 4.1% 
1982 285.8 billion -16% 
1983 297.9 billion -16% 
1984 300.1 billion -1% 
1985 300.8 billion -1% 
1986 308.1 billion 0.6% 
1987 325.1 billion 8.4% 
1988 302.1 billion 13.5% 
Source: World Bank Group, 1990 
 
Levy-Livermore (1995) further discussed that, before the Latin American economy 
started to recover in 1986, the economic growth dropped 34 percent from 1982 (from 
1982 to 1986) which is approximately equal to the economic growth of Latin America 
from 1976 to 1981 (see Table 2.1). This suggests that the Latin American debt crisis 
knocked back the Latin American economy for about 10 years (1976-1986). 
According to Bertola and Ocampo (2012), this is because external debts mainly drove 
economic growth in Latin American countries during the 1970s. Therefore, when 
foreign investors started to leave the Latin American markets in 1982 (over 6% of 
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GDP outflows per year during the period from 1982 to 1987), the economic growth of 
the countries crashed. 
 
Kaminsky and Pereira (1996) analyzed a panel data of 33 debtor countries (mainly 
Latin American countries) and provided empirical evidence to support the debt 
overhanghypothesis and concluded that the debt crisis can easily lead to economic 
growth collapse. According to the authors’ study, the sovereign debt problem 
encouraged creditors to leave the country which created large outward resource 
transfers. Part of the return to investment was taken away from the domestic economy 
to pay foreign creditors. As a result, these outward transfers imposed a disincentive 
for investment and economic growth in the debtor economies. This impact is known 
as a panic sale in which a number of creditors leave the market and others follow. 
According to Borensztein (1990), if a country has to transfer 5% of GDP outwards 
(for example to repay debts or interest) and is unable to borrow in the international 
credit markets during the period, then investment and consumption will decrease 
about 1.8% and 2.6%, respectively. This explained why the 1980s’ Latin American 
debt crisis was more serious in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, since these 
countries were the first to adopt financial liberalisation in the 1970s. According to 
Kaminsky and Pereira (1996), financial liberalisation allows capital freedom to move 
between markets without regulations; thus, the adoption of financial liberalisation 
prevents the government controlling capital movements. Consequently, the massive 
capital outflow in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela significantly decreased the 
countries’ investment and consumption, which additionally increased the impact of 
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the 1980s’ Latin American debt crisis on the countries’ economies. 
 
Krueger (1987) studied the 1980s’ debt crisis in developing countries such as 
Argentina, Peru, Brazil, Mexico, etc. in order to trace the origins of the debt crisis. 
Regardless of the external shock, including the increase in oil prices since 1979 and 
the extremely tight monetary conditions, leading to a dramatic decrease in exports, the 
author pointed out that the increase in debt to GDP and external debt to export ratio 
also significantly contributed to the debt crises. First, an increase in debt to GDP ratio 
suggests an increase in the countries’ debt burden. A higher debt burden creates a 
higher sovereign debt risk. Second, an increase in the debt to export ratio implies 
external debt increases much faster than exports; external debt decreases much more 
slowly than exports, or even worse, external debt increases while exports decrease. 
These can potentially lead to a country’s lack of foreign reserves to repay the external 
debt and resort to selling domestic currency to repay such debt, which further creates 
large pressures on the currency exchange market. As a result, the higher debt burden 
will not only increase the risk of a debt crisis, but also harm the currency exchange 
price (Krueger, 1987). 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) also confirmed that the debt surge is an important signal 
of crises approaching. By testing the origin of debt crises over 70 countries, the 
authors confirmed that a debt surge increased the government’s debt burden and 
weakened the sovereign debt sustainability, because the debt surge creates large 
pressures on the country’ interest repayments. For example, the total interest of the 
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external loan in Latin American countries was as high as 235 billion US dollars in 
1982. Evidence of a debt surge occurred during the pre-crisis period in Argentina 
where the external debt to GDP ratio of Argentina in 1975 was 18.6%. This ratio 
increased to 30.2% in 1979 and further increased to 60.3% in 1982 and finally caused 
a debt crisis (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). 
 
According to Cardoso (1991), Brazil also suffered the pain of the 1980s’ Latin 
American debt crisis. The author reported that Brazil experienced hyperinflation when 
the debt crisis spread to Brazil. During the 1980s’ Latin American debt crisis period, 
Brazilian inflation rates increases dramatically. Brazil’s inflation was 1.5% per month 
before 1980 and increased to 6% per month in a short period (from 1980 to 1982), 
which suggests that the Brazilian economy had begun to weaken. Following the Latin 
American debt crisis in 1982, Brazilian inflation increased to 10.5% per month, which 
then caused the Brazilian economy to crash (for example the economic growth of 
Brazil decreased by 7.2% from 1981 to 1983). Brazilian inflation kept increasing in 
the 1980s and reached as high as 50% per month in December 1989 (Cardoso, 1991). 
 
2.3 Other individual debt crisis in Latin America 
 
Beyond the 1980s’ debt crisis, some other individual debt crises also occurred in Latin 
American countries such as Argentina and Mexico. 
 
2.3.1 Argentina 
 
Argentina is one of the four largest Latin American countries. Its GDP in 2014 was 
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USD540.2 billion which made it the third largest economy in Latin America, followed 
by Brazil and Mexico. Argentina had experienced a series of debt defaults such as 
those in 1982 (see Section 2.1) and in 2001 (Reinhart, 2010). In December 2001, the 
Argentinean government defaulted on a 97.6 billion US dollars debt which was the 
largest sovereign debt default in history before 2012. Many researchers have been 
intrigued with the debt crises in Argentina, including Monteleone (2013), Datz (2012) 
and Helleiner (2005).  
 
According to Monteleone (2013), Argentina has experienced a more than ten-year 
default on its debt since December of 2001. In particular, Argentina restructured its 
debt in 2005, 2007 and 2010; however, around 6.8 billion US dollars worth of 
government debts still remained in default in 2013. Datz (2012) studied the Argentine 
debt history of the pre-crisis and crisis periods from 1993 to 2010 and found that the 
sovereign debt problem significantly impacted the national welfare where the pension 
funds hold large amounts of sovereign debt. According to the author’s study, while the 
reform in 1993 ended the external sovereign debt default after 1982 (also see Reinhart, 
2010), the Argentinean government established private pension funds. Since then, the 
pension funds have become an important source of credit for the government of 
Argentina. Rofman (2012) also confirmed that, owing to the lack of alternatives and 
the high yields of government bonds, the pension funds of Argentina purchased a 
large amount of Argentina’s sovereign debt (see Table 2.2). The weight of government 
bonds in the total assets of Argentine pension funds was 40.89% in 1997; however, 
this number increased to 75.3% in 2002, just after the government announced its 
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default on sovereign debt in December of 2001. Consequently, Argentina’s pension 
funds suffered huge losses, which made the pension funds nearly default until they 
were reformed in 2007.  
 
Table 2.2 Weight of Government Bond in the Portfolio of Pension Funds in Argentina 1997-2006 
Year  Weight 
1997  40.89% 
1998  47.98% 
1999  48.84% 
2000  49.10% 
2001  61.53% 
2002  75.30% 
2003  67.98% 
2004  60.05% 
2005  55% 
2006  54% 
Source: SAFJP, 2007 
 
Boonman, Jacobs and Kuper (2013) observed the debt crises of the four largest Latin 
American countries including Argentina, from 1870 to 2012 in order to establish a 
sovereign debt index to measure the likelihood of a sovereign debt crisis. The authors 
believed that regardless of external shocks, the debt to GDP ratio and the export to 
import ratio are important determinants of debt crises. According to the authors, the 
debt to GDP ratio captures the debt burden for a country, and the export to import 
ratio is one of the key estimators for a country’ debt affordability. As a result, these 
two fundamentals capture the ability for external loan repayments. 
 
The 1980s’ Latin American debt crisis brought hyperinflation to Argentina (see Table 
2.3). During the debt crisis period from 1982 to 1991, there was an average three-digit 
inflation rate (over 700%) in Argentina. To deal with hyperinflation, Argentina’s 
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government introduced a currency board system in April 1991 (Kitano, 2005). The 
currency board is a system that requires the central bank to hold international reserves, 
which equal no less than 100 percent of their monetary base. According to the 
author’s study, although Argentina’s central bank had prepared enough foreign 
reserves to respond to arbitrary withdrawals, it could not avoid a currency crisis in 
2002. The author found that the rapid accumulation of the debt level fuelled a 
currency crisis. This is because a debt surge creates large pressure on interest 
payments in the following years. The large interest repayments required more foreign 
reserves which increased the demand for foreign currency, which led to a devaluation 
of the Argentine Peso. The devaluation of the currency can easily start a currency 
crisis. 
 
Table 2.3 Inflation Rates in Argentina 1982-1997 
Year  Inflation Rate (%) 
1982  164.8 
1983  343.8 
1984  626.7 
1985  672.2 
1986  90.1 
1987  131.3 
1988  343 
1989  3079.8 
1990  2314 
1991  171.7 
1992  24.9 
1993  10.6 
1994  4.2 
1995  3.4 
1996  0.2 
1997  0.5 
Source: World Bank, 2014 
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2.3.2 Mexico 
 
Similarly to Argentina, Mexico, another major country in Latin America, has also 
suffered several debt crises since the 1980s’ Latin American debt crises. Owing to the 
devaluation of Mexico’s Peso in 1994, credit cost was extremely high (Gil-Diaz, 
1998), which caused Mexico’s inability to roll over the government debt. According 
to the author, the devaluation of the Mexico Peso led a massive capital outflow from 
Mexico, where creditors started to leave the Mexican capital market to avoid 
exchange rate losses. This caused a liquidity problem in the credit market that led to 
increases in the price of credit. As a result, the cost was too high for the Mexican 
government to roll over its debts. Cole and Kehoe (1996) explained that, because they 
feared that the Mexican government would be unable to service its debt coming due, 
investors were unwilling to purchase new Mexican government bonds. Thus Mexico 
was forced into debt default. The authors further studied the origin of this panic and 
found that the maturity of debt also had an impact on the debt crisis to some extent. 
For example, while Mexico defaulted on its debt in December 1994, the average 
maturity of Mexico’s domestic debt was extremely short, which was about 200 days. 
At the same time, however, the debt to GDP ratio, which was considered as the major 
determinant of debt crises, was at 37.4 percent much lower than that of some other 
non-default countries (see Table 2.4). Thus, the author concluded that extremely short 
average sovereign debt maturity may potentially increase the sovereign debt risk of 
the country. 
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Table 2.4 Debt to GDP Ratio for Selected Countries 1991-1994 
  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Mexico  45.8  35.1  35.0  37.4 
France  41.1  45.6  52.9  56.8 
Germany  42.7  47.3  51.8  54.6 
Italy  103.9  111.4  120.2  122.6 
Greece  81.7  88.6  117.1  119.8 
Source: IMF, 1995 
 
2.4 European Debt Crises 
 
Most recent debt crises have occurred in Europe, and the sovereign debt problem 
became a popular topic among economists. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 marked the start of the global financial crisis. Its impacts, however, 
can be traced back to as early as August 2007 when major European banks exposed 
their losses in the U.S. asset-backed securities market (Acharya & Schnabl, 2010). 
The 2008 global financial crisis deeply shocked Europe in 2008 and 2009, and 
brought debt crises into European Union member countries. 
 
According to Mody and Sandri (2012), the increase in bank-sector losses on bad loans 
had a negative impact on sovereign bond values in the Eurozone countries; and some 
European Union member countries, such as Greece, Ireland, and Spain, reported an 
unexpected rise in deficit in GDP ratios. In particular, Lane (2012) gave an example 
of Greece where the budget deficit forecast for 2009, announced in October 2009, was 
12.7 percent more than double the previous estimate of 6 percent. The unexpected rise 
in deficit increased the short-term risks of Greece. For example, the 2008 global 
financial crisis caused a sudden stop in the global credit market, which decreased the 
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credit supply globally. This required the governments of all the nations of the world to 
decrease their deficits to cope with difficult times; however, Greece failed to decrease 
its deficits, which hurt the Greek economy and ultimately resulted in sovereign debt 
difficulties. Lane (2012) argued that a large and sudden capital outflow would lead to 
a decrease in asset prices and an increase in the unemployment rate. 
 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (PIIGS countries) had sovereign debt 
problems that strongly impacted the economic growth of the Eurozone, and made all 
European Union members pay for the consequences. For example, Table 1.1 shows a 
total USD274 billion bailout that has already been paid out by European Union 
members and the IMF to Greece from 2010 to 2012 and over 80% of these bailouts 
(USD225 billion) were made by Eurozone members. This strongly impacts the EU 
and slows down the economic growth of the Eurozone (William, 2013). However, 
according to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) report, owing to the recent 
sovereign rating and the global economy not recovering rapidly (Spiegel, 2013), 
Greece was not able to raise enough money by selling sovereign debt in the open 
market in 2014. As a result, Eurozone financial ministers decided to bailout Greece a 
third time valued at USD96 billion and extended the repayment period for the existing 
loans (Greece bailout: Eurozone deal unlocks 10.3bn euro, 2016). 
 
Lane (2012) explained why such debt crises occurred in PIIGS countries, but not in 
other European Union members. According to Lane, the extremely high increase in 
the sovereign debt to GDP ratio (for Italy, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) and the 
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domestic credit to GDP ratio (for Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) played an important 
role in leading to a debt crisis. For example, according to Table 2.5, PIIGS countries 
experienced a high increase in the debt to GDP ratio during the pre-crisis period (the 
debt to GDP ratio increased by 11.3% for Greece from 2007-2009, 14.8% for Italy 
from 2007-2009, 55% for Ireland from 2007-2010 and 32.7% for Portugal from 
2007-2010). During the same period, the debt to GDP ratio in Germany only 
increased by 6.8% (from 2007 to 2009). Table 2.6 shows the domestic credit to GDP 
ratio of PIIGS countries has increased by over 30% since 2006, while this number did 
not significantly change in Germany. In addition, the government debt to GDP ratio of 
PIIGS countries and Germany changed little from 2001 to 2006; however, the ratio of 
PIIGS countries have dramatically increased since 2007 (see Table 2.5). By the end of 
2014, the government debt to GDP ratios of PIIGS countries were at least 50% higher 
than the ratios in 2006, the ratio of Ireland particularly was around 4 times higher than 
that in 2006. As a result, Lane (2012) believed that the debt to GDP ratio is one of the 
important determinants of sovereign debt crises. 
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Table 2.5 Government Debt-GDP Ratios of PIIGS Countries Compared with Germany 2001-2014 
Year Greece Italy Ireland Portugal Spain Germany 
2001 127.9 117.9 37.2 59 54.5 38.1 
2002 128.9 115.2 35.5 63.3 53 39.3 
2003 124.3 110.8 34.2 64.9 48.3 41 
2004 128.1 110.6 32.7 67.4 47.3 43 
2005 125.4 112.8 33 70.3 38.5 44.7 
2006 128.5 109.1 29.2 69.4 34 43.5 
2007 125.6 104.3 28.7 67.5 30.1 40.8 
2008 121.3 107.2 48.6 78.9 34.2 43.1 
2009 136.9 119.1 67.0 91.1 46.1 47.6 
2010 132.4 114.7 83.7 100.2 53.6 53.8 
2011 111.1 108.3 110.0 102.4 61.8 53.4 
2012 165.5 127.0 130.5 133.9 83.5 55.2 
2013 181.9 134.9 133.0 138.0 96.5 52.3 
2014 178.8 156.2 125.4 150.6 117.9 82.2 
Source: World Bank, 2015 
Table 2.6 Domestic Credit-GDP Ratios of PIIGS Countries Compared with Germany 2001-2014 
Year Greece Italy Ireland Portugal Spain Germany 
2001 50.1 60.6 72.3 115 95.1 112.0 
2002 53.3 62.2 75.9 119 99.4 110.9 
2003 57.2 65.5 86.2 120.6 106.4 109.5 
2004 62.3 67.9 105.4 121.1 115.7 106.1 
2005 72.0 71 125.5 124.7 135.5 104.9 
2006 76.3 75.9 145.5 133.4 156.1 101.7 
2007 84.5 82 158.4 142.2 167.1 96.6 
2008 89.3 83.9 166.7 151.7 170.2 96.4 
2009 88.0 87.8 170.7 159.8 172.4 98.2 
2010 111.6 93.4 135.3 155.3 170.7 88.0 
2011 117.2 94.6 116.1 156.2 166 84.6 
2012 116.8 94.3 113.1 152.9 154.6 83.5 
2013 118.3 91 107.2 144 142.5 81.8 
2014 116.9 89.3 84.9 129.8 127.4 79.6 
Source: World Bank, 2015 
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However, Cottarelli (2012) argued that in the context of the global economy and 
countries, the debt to GDP ratio and the deficit to GDP ratio of PIIGS countries were 
not as high as compared to some other countries that did not default on their debts. 
The author claimed that the debt to GDP ratio of Japan (189.4) was higher than that of 
PIIGS countries in 2011, and the deficit to GDP ratio of PIIGS countries was lower 
than that of the U.K. (-7.4). Table 2.5 shows the debt to GDP ratio of PIIGS countries 
in 2011 was 98.72 on average, which is much lower than that of Japan (189.4). 
Similarly, the deficit to GDP ratios of PIIGS countries, especially for Greece (-10.5) 
and Ireland (-12.6), were lower than that of the U.K. (-7.4) in 2011 As a result, the 
author believed that the debt to GDP ratio and deficit to GDP ratio were not the only 
contribution to the debt crises of PIIGS countries. The reason of the recent debt crises 
occurred in Europe may also be because of the currency policy in the European Union. 
The author argued that the current currency policy in the European Union treats the 
Eurozone as a whole, which may not be efficient and appropriate for each single 
member. This is due to the unified currency policy in the EU which switches off the 
ability of a country to use monetary policy to adjust the country’s economy. In 
addition, the unified monetary policy treats the EU as a whole and may ignore the 
differences between members, which may cause the monetary policy to be inefficient 
for some EU members. 
 
Lane (2012) further explained that the difference in Euro-zone countries compared to 
other countries is the unified currency – the euro. According to the author’s study, 
trading in Euros in Eurozone countries switched off the option for national currency 
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devaluation, which is a traditional and effective economic adjustment mechanism. 
Further, in the original design of the European currency union, the unified currency 
had to be met with a unified banking and fiscal union in the Eurozone countries which 
required the central banks and governments of EU members to work together and 
come up with a unified policy across Euro-zone countries. However, there is no 
significant degree of banking or fiscal union inside the EU to meet the original design. 
This also negatively affects Eurozone countries’ economic condition. 
 
Helleiner’s (2005) study showed the export to import ratio is an important 
determinant of the external debts’ repayment ability. Generally, a devaluation of a 
national currency can generate a price advantage in international trading markets 
where increasing export helps to service the debt. Under the 2008 global financial 
crisis context, the single currency policy of the EU precluded individual members 
from using the exchange rate to adjust the decreasing trend in exports. Table 2.7 
shows the dynamics of the export to GDP ratios in PIIGS countries during the period 
from 2008 to 2015. Only Ireland exhibited a positive growth in the export to GDP rate 
(11.16%) before the Eurozone debt crisis occurred in 2010. The export to GDP ratios 
of the other four PIIGS countries experienced a significant drop during the period 
from 2008 to 2009; the average decrease in such ratio was over 14%. The reason 
behind the problem is that the unified currency policy switched off the option of a 
national currency devaluation, leading to a significant decrease in exports during the 
2008 global financial crisis due to the devaluation of the US dollar that decreased the 
competitive price advantage of these Eurozone members. The dramatic decrease in 
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exports harmed the PIIGS countries’ ability to repay sovereign loans (based on 
Helleiner (2005)’s findings), which significantly increased the sovereign risk of the 
countries. 
 
Table 2.7 Changes in Export to GDP Ratios of PIIGS Countries 2008-2015 
 Greece Italy Ireland Portugal Spain 
2008 23.4 27 84.2 31.1 25.3 
2009 19 22.5 93.6 27.1 22.7 
Changes -18.80% -16.67% 11.16% -12.86% -10.28% 
2010 22.1 25.2 103.1 29.9 25.5 
2011 25.5 27 101.2 34.3 28.9 
2012 28.7 28.6 107.2 37.7 30.6 
2013 30.6 28.9 106.7 39.5 32 
2014 32.7 29.5 113.7 40 32.5 
2015 30.1 30.2 121.4 40.3 33.1 
Source: World Bank, 2015 
 
Similarly, Cui (2012) noted that Japan’s sovereign debt burden was higher than that of 
European Union members and supported Helleiner’s (2005) findings. According to 
Cui’s explanation, the euro brings a unified monetary policy for all EU members. As a 
result, EU members are left with only fiscal policy in their hands to adjust the 
country’s economy; the capability to manoeuvre monetary policy is taken over by the 
EU financial administration. Owing to the different adjustment mechanisms, fiscal 
policy, and monetary policy are often used together. However, changes in fiscal policy 
alone may not be able to adjust the country’s economic condition successfully. For 
example, by changing monetary policy, governments can adjust the money supply to 
control the international trade and inflation. However, fiscal policy is mainly used to 
control government spending; in an inflationary economic condition, fiscal policy 
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may not be efficient. Further, an increase in the government spending to stimulate the 
economy will easily result in a heavy debt burden for the country. For example, the 
2008 financial crisis negatively impacted the global economy. The PIIGS countries 
were unable to use monetary policy to adjust their economies and exports owing to 
the unified monetary policy of the EU, which resulted in a larger decrease in the 
exports to GDP ratio (-14%) compared with that of the EU (-11%) and the world 
average (-13%). The use of fiscal policy alone caused a heavy debt burden for PIIGS 
(Table 2.5) which led to the 2010 Eurozone debt crisis. 
 
2.5 Iceland 
 
In addition to the Eurozone, other European countries such as Iceland also 
experienced a debt crisis. The Iceland crisis in 2008 provided a frightening example 
of debt defaults, which led to the systemic collapse of the Icelandic banking system. 
Iceland governments introduced an expansionary fiscal policy after 1995 that 
significantly impacted inflation in Iceland. To deal with the inflation, according to 
Arnbjornsson and Gronvold (2009), the Iceland government increased the interest rate 
from 5.3% in 2003 to 15% in 2008. This significant increase led to a massive inflow 
of capital speculating on the interest differential between Iceland and other countries. 
As a result of the capital inflow, the Icelandic Krona (currency) was over-appreciated 
by about 30%. The 2008 financial crisis shocked the global financial market and 
foreign creditors stopped investing in Iceland and outwardly transferred their capital 
from Iceland. Consequently, the capital outflows led to the depreciation of the 
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Icelandic Krona. For example, the authors pointed out that the Icelandic Krona was 
devalued by 20% and 25% in March and June of 2008, respectively. This made the 
foreign debt extremely expensive in Iceland, which led to a sovereign debt default and 
the systemic collapse of the Icelandic banking system. Consequently, a 6 billion U.S. 
dollar rescue package from the IMF was needed to bail out Iceland (Duncan, 2008). 
 
2.6 Impacts of Debt Crises 
 
The issue of sovereign debt not only leads to a potential crisis of debt, but also may 
spread to other sectors of the economy. For example, the debt crisis is always 
accompanied by a bank crisis, a liquidity crisis and a currency crisis (see Arteta & 
Hale, 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). 
 
2.6.1 Debt and Liquidity Crises 
 
Drudi and Giordano (2000) claimed that rational investors are risk averse. When a 
country falls into sovereign debt default, rational investors especially foreign 
investors are more likely to withdraw their capital from that market to a safer zone. 
Consequently, a debt crisis significantly and negatively impacts the credit market, 
potentially leading to a liquidity shortage. For example, the 1980s’ Latin America debt 
crisis caused bank runs in Latin American countries due to the capital leaving the 
countries and devaluation of the countries’ currencies. These bank runs created a 
liquidity problem in the Latin American countries. For example, Mexico temporarily 
froze citizens’ bank accounts in foreign currency in order to prevent depletion of the 
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Mexican foreign reserves because Mexican government was unable to exchange 
enough credit to repay foreign debts (Cardoso, 1992). 
 
Similarly, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) suggested that sovereign debt defaults 
(especially domestic defaults) sometimes might involve the forcible conversion of 
foreign currency deposits into local currency or deposit freezes, which could lead to a 
liquidity crisis (also see Arteta & Hale, 2008; Perri & Neumeyer, 2005). 
 
For example, Arteta and Hale (2008) studied the relationship between debt crisis and 
credit market in 30 emerging markets between 1984 and 2004, and successfully found 
systematic evidence of a decrease in credit availability in the aftermath of sovereign 
debt crises. The authors found that during the sovereign debt crisis, the credit 
availability would generally decline by more than 20% over at least two years. 
 
Perri and Neumeyer (2005) addressed the impact of fundamental shocks on the cost of 
capital. The authors used a data set of 10 markets of both emerging economies (such 
as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) and developed economies (such as Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand) and found about 27% of output losses given a sovereign 
default risk. The authors confirmed that fundamental shocks such as sovereign debt 
issues have amplified the effects on a country’s credit market. This could be explained 
by the panic effect. According to Kiyotaki and Moore’s (2005) study, an exposure to a 
sovereign debt problem may lead investors and creditors to start questioning the 
default risk of government debt. The sovereign risk may cause panic selling and 
devalued government bonds, which negatively impacts the credit market. 
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Generally, before a sovereign default has acutely occurred, the government tends to 
over borrow from the banking system in order to avoid or postpone debt default or 
restructuring. Through issuing and rolling over massive government bonds, domestic 
liquidity becomes extremely scarce, which could lead to an increasing demand for 
foreign credit for both the banking system and non-financial firms (Arteta & Hale, 
2008). Further, when a country defaults or renegotiates its sovereign debt, whether or 
not it has been formally announced, the sovereign default risk will rise. The increase 
in the sovereign default risk will lead to an increase in the country’s risk premium 
(Kiyotaki & Moore, 2005). This will dramatically impact the credit market. As a 
consequence, Arteta and Hale (2008) believed that a sovereign debt crisis potentially 
could impact the credit market by making raising credit become extremely difficult or 
even impossible, which suggests a liquidity shortage or crisis approaching. For 
example, the 1980s’ Latin American debt crisis devalued the currency of all the Latin 
American countries and creditors withdrew capital out of Latin America and as a 
result, the Latin American governments were not able to borrow or exchange enough 
credit in the open market, which led to a liquidity crisis. Similarly, Drudi and 
Giordano (2000) also confirmed that sovereign debt defaults have a negative impact 
on the credit market and may lead to a liquidity shortage in the capital market (also 
see Perri & Neumeyer, 2005). 
 
2.6.2 Debt and Bank Crises 
 
Arteta and Hale (2008) suggest that when a country is near defaulton its sovereign 
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debt, the government tends to postpone debt restructuring and drain the banking 
system in order to service the debt, while hoping the country can avoid a debt crisis. 
By doing so, the government issues or rolls over massive government bonds in the 
domestic banks. This kind of strategy links banks’ risk with the sovereign risk; once a 
crisis occurs in one sector it will immediately spread to other sectors. This is more so 
for banks that hold a large number of government bonds in which a sovereign default 
can significantly impact the banks’ performance by decreasing the banks’ profitability 
and assets values. For example, Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2011) observed a 30% 
to 50% haircut on the sovereign debt asset value loss for banks that held heavy 
sovereign debts of PIIGS countries during the 2010 Euro-zone debt crisis period, 
which significantly impacted the banks’ performance. 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) investigated the total external debt of emerging markets 
from 1970 to 2009 and found that the significant increase in a country’s external debt 
was systematically linked to both government default and a systemic banking crisis. 
The authors argued that this link also holds in advanced economies, for example in 
the U.S. the external debt to GDP ratio doubled during the 2005-2007 period which 
systematically contributed to the 2008 global financial crisis. 
 
Similarly, Mendoza and Terrones (2008) investigated 22 credit booms in industrial 
countries and 27 credit booms in emerging economies from 1960 to 2006. The authors 
found that credit booms are associated with economic expansion. During the period of 
economic expansion, both governments and firms tend to over borrow from the credit 
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market which leads to an increase in credit prices. Therefore, once the economic 
expansion rate slows down, the returns on investments may not be enough to repay 
the interest. Governments may default on the debts and banks will hold many 
non-performing loans. As a result, most credit booms are followed by debt crises, 
banking crises or both. For example, the authors noticed that Chile experienced a 
credit boom from 1971 to 1982 which peaked in 1982; following that, the 1980s’ 
Latin American crisis occurred and crushed the sovereign debt and banking system of 
Chile. 
 
Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2011) studied the relationship between sovereign debt 
crisis and banking crisis in the 2010 European debt crisis. The authors found that 
banks heavily held sovereign debt of PIIGS countries experienced 30% to 50% 
haircuts on the sovereign debt assets value. This can negatively impact banks’ 
performance. 
 
Furthermore, Bernanke (1983) also pointed out that sovereign defaults not only 
increase the credit cost but may also cause many problems such as failure of firms 
(especially small size firms) and increase the unemployment rate. These, in turn, will 
increase banks’ non-performing loan rate, which potentially leads to a banking crisis. 
 
2.6.3 Debt and Currency Crises 
 
Herz and Tong (2004) analyzed the interrelation between debt and currency crises 
based on a data set of 74 developing countries from 1975 to 2001 and confirmed the 
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strong link between the two crises. According to the authors’ result, debt and currency 
crises may be strongly linked together through some common fundamental causes 
such as the reserve to import ratio, FDI over external debt ratio and GDP growth rate. 
The authors further explained that a debt crisis or the expectation of a debt crisis 
negatively impacts the credit market and indirectly increases the interest rates, 
potentially leading to a currency crisis. 
 
Similarly, Babecky et al. (2012) investigated the origins of currency and banking 
crises using a quarterly data set of 40 countries from 1970 to 2010 and found a strong 
link between government debt and currency/banking crises. In particularly, the 
authors found that the interest rate, government balance, and central bank reserves are 
important determinants of the risk of currency crises occurring. Further, increasing 
domestic credit prices and rising interest rates have been found to contribute to 
banking crises. Countries’ debt crises significantly impact the domestic credit market, 
government balance and interest rate directly; consequently, debt crises can 
potentially lead to not only banking crises, but also currency crises. As a result, debt 
and currency crises were named “new twin crises” by Herz and Tong (2004), separate 
from the twin banking and currency crises in Kaminsky and Reinhart’s (1999) study. 
 
Chiodo and Owyang (2002) defined a currency crisis as a shockto a country’s 
currency resulting in a devaluation and possible debt default. The authors believed 
that the sovereign debt and currency crises are linked together through the devaluation 
of the country’s currency. Once a sovereign debt crisis occurs, foreign creditors will 
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withdrawal their capital which leads to a decrease in the country’s currency exchange 
rate. On the other hand, currency devaluation significantly increases the cost of 
repaying external debts that may lead to a default on sovereign debts. According to 
Wade (1998), the 1997 Asian financial crisis began with the devaluation of the Thai 
baht in July 1997 and spread to other Asian economies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Korea and Philippines and finally became a debt crisis Asian-wide. 
 
Ozkan and Sutherland (1995) investigated the factors that may cause a currency crisis. 
The authors believed that maturity of debt and the weight of external debt in total 
sovereign debt have a significant impact on the probability of a currency crisis 
occurring. According to the authors’ study, longer average debt maturity can help to 
decrease the risk of a currency crisis; meanwhile, countries with higher external debt 
weight (external debt over total debt) may easily experience a currency devaluation. 
This is due to, on the one hand, higher external debt weight which implies 
governments have to exchange domestic currency for foreign currency to repay debts 
on maturity; on the other hand, the debt repayment pressure from short debt maturity 
may require the governments to borrow a large amount of credits in a short period. 
These create large downward pressure on the domestic currency exchange rate, which 
potentially leads to a currency devaluation. 
 
2.7 Debt Crisis in China? 
 
In the Asian area, the 1997 Asian financial crisis significantly impacted the economy 
of Asian countries and the sovereign debt issue played an important role in the crisis. 
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At present, China is in a situation of a high debt burden, lower economic growth, and 
lower exports. Considering the large GDP amount and its important role in 
international trade, China’s debt problem can significantly impact the global economy. 
Whether China is the leader of the next regional or global debt crisis depends on how 
China’s government learns the lessons from the previous crises. 
 
2.7.1 The Asian experience of the debt problem 
 
Capital liberalization adopted by Asian countries allowed capital inflow and outflow 
freedom over the 1990s, bringing large foreign credit inflows which pumped up the 
economy of Asian countries such as Thailand and South Korea (Wade, 1998). 
However, this economic boom was associated with a heavy foreign debt burden due 
to the massive credit inflows. For example, the foreign debt to GDP ratio increased 
105.9% and 52.6% from 1990 to 1996 in South Korea and Thailand, respectively. 
According to Ozkan and Sutherland (1995), large foreign debts may create large 
pressure on the domestic currency exchange rate due to the requirement of large 
amounts of foreign currency to repay foreign debts. As a result, the Thai baht was 
devalued in July 1997 and started the 1997 Asian financial crisis. During the crisis, 
the Thai baht, and the Korean won had devalued nearly 50% against the U.S. dollar 
(Wade, 1998). Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) noticed that the imbalances in 
foreign debt accumulation and management, in other words, a heavy foreign debt 
burden, and average short maturity length played an important role in the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. 
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2.7.2 China’s sovereign issues 
 
The recent European sovereign debt crisis in 2009 sent a signal to the Chinese 
government and policymakers that they needed to pay more attention to the country’s 
debt risk. The news media reported a heavy sovereign debt burden and an increasing 
sovereign debt risk in China. For example, Dyer (2008) reported a 4000 billion RMB 
fiscal stimulus package had been made by the Chinese government in 2008 in order to 
avoid a potential economic recession during the 2008 global financial crisis. However, 
according to Li (2013), this massive stimulus package created a large sovereign debts 
burden in China. Besides, the economic growth of China depends heavily on exports; 
China’s export to GDP ratio was about 40% in 2007. Consequently, the decrease in 
exports due to the 2008 financial crisis generated a downward pressure on economic 
growth in China (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). The decrease in both exports (-16% 
in 2009) and GDP (-5% in GDP growth from 2007 to 2009), along with a heavy 
sovereign debt burden (total debt to GDP ratio reached as high as 282% in 2015) 
generated by the massive stimulus package, created a significant sovereign debt risk 
in China (Hinds, 2013). However, study on China’s sovereign debt risk is limited (see 
Hou et al., 2012; Fan & Lv, 2012 and Li, 2012). 
 
Hou et al. (2012) analyzed China’s economic stimulus policies since the global 
financial crisis in 2008 and claimed that China’s government faced serious challenges 
from the global financial crisis. For example, as a result of the European debt crisis 
the euro currency depreciated over 10%, which significantly impacted exports that use 
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the euro as the settlement currency. Consequently, the authors noticed that the 
depreciation of the euro currency may bring foreign exchange losses to China’s 
exports when the export companies exchange the euro currency back to Chinese RMB. 
Second, because of the economic stimulus plan, especially the 4 trillion RMB 
stimulus package, the GDP growth rate of China successfully remained steadily; 
however, the economic growth of China was mainly from exports (before the 2008 
global financial crisis) and government investments (after the crisis). This long-term 
imbalance between investments and consumption suggest an unhealthy economic 
condition exists in China (Hou et al., 2012). 
 
The 2008 global financial crisis negatively impacted the global economy; as a result, 
international trade experienced a dramatic decrease including China’s exports. 
Historically, exports play an important role in China’s economy. As a result, in order 
to maintain China’s GDP growth, China’s central government decided to adopt a 
RMB4 trillion stimulus program. However, the central government paid no more than 
30% of the total RMB4 trillion stimulus package (which is about RMB1.18 trillion) 
and left the rest of the payment (RMB2.82 trillion) to the local governments (Fan & 
Lv, 2012). According to Fan and Lv (2012), in order to meet the requirements of this 
stimulus plan, Chinese local governments had to pay about RMB2.82 trillion (70% of 
the stimulus package) which far exceeded the tax reserve of local governments. This 
meant Chinese local governments would not be able to implement the stimulus plan 
unless they could borrow from the market which was impossible under the monetary 
policy of China before 2011 (the policy banned local governments from issuing loans 
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in the open market before 2011). As a result, China came up with a new monetary 
policy in 2011, which allowed local governments to issue loans and bonds in order to 
raise money in the open market(Chinese Financial Department document number, 
2011 [52]).  
 
Under the Tax Sharing System, local governments in China took 40 percent of the 
national government revenues. However, since the 2008 global financial crisis, more 
than 60 percent of China’s government expenditure has come from local governments 
(Fan & Lv, 2012). Consequently, China’s local government public debt has increased 
significantly in recent years. For example, the total amount of Chinese local 
governments’ debt was RMB1.7 trillion in the first half of 2008, however, this amount 
rose to RMB10.7 trillion at the end of 2010 (Li, 2012). This significant increase in the 
local government debts pushes up the debt burden and loan repayment pressure of the 
Chinese government. Consequently, the dramatic sovereign debt surge may lead to a 
potential sovereign debt problem in China. 
 
In 2006, the Chinese government brought out a new Land Remising law to manage 
the land-remising fee. Under the policy, “the revenues and expenditures of public 
land-remising are supposed to be in the local governments’ special budgets” (Chinese 
Government document number, 2006 [31]). Following this, land-remising fees 
became one of the most important sources of Chinese local government revenue, 
particularly to finance local government public debt and expenditure of the stimulus 
package (Fan &Lv, 2012). 
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Hou (2009) studied the house price dynamics in Beijing and Shanghai and founds 
significant speculation behavior in the Chinese housing market, which can potentially 
create a real estate bubble and endanger the Chinese economy. Similarly, Wu, 
Gyourko, and Deng (2012) reported an extremely high house price to income ratio 
and confirmed that a housing bubble was occurring in China. Chen, Gan, Hu and 
Cohen (2013) investigated the Chinese housing market and confirmed a housing 
bubble in the housing market. The authors also successfully captured land prices as an 
important determinant of house supply cost which has a strong relationship with 
house prices in China. Thus, if China’s housing bubble bursts, it will significantly 
impact house prices and house demands. Further, the decrease in the housing market 
will be transferred to the land market. Once the housing bubble bursts, the housing 
demand will decrease, which decreases the housing development. The demand for 
land will be negatively impacted which then causes a decrease in the land prices. 
Similarly, Fan and Lv (2012) argued that the land-remising fee is one of the key 
components of local government revenue (for example the land-remising fee occupied 
about 35% of China’s local government revenue in 2013and 30% of that in 2014); as 
a result, a decrease in land prices and land demands will dramatically decrease the 
local government revenue. Further, decrease in the local government revenues 
negatively affects the repayment ability of Chinese local government. Therefore, a 
sudden shock in China’s housing market may result in decreasing debt affordability 
(ability to repay debt) of the Chinese local government. This can potentially lead to a 
local government debt crisis in China. 
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Similarly, John (2011) argued that because of the massive stimulation package 
implemented by the Chinese government, bank lending increased by 100 percent in 
2009. This may generate a potential debt issue as Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) suggest 
that public debt increased significantly during a short period which could be a sign of 
a debt crisis approaching. In addition, in order to avoid the potential risk of a housing 
bubble crisis, restrictions and policies have been implemented by the Chinese 
government to reduce house prices (restrictions and policies that include increasing 
down payments for housing loans when households buy a second house; taxes for 
price increases when selling houses if the house is not held for more than 5 years). 
These restrictions and policies help to decrease the housing demand by reducing the 
speculation activities in the housing market and reduced the market house prices. The 
drop in house prices will negatively impact the bank’s collateral value on housing 
loans (John, 2011). The collateral damage is not only in commercial housing loans, 
but also in industrial loans using housing materials, such as polymer, polyethylene 
(PE), polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and acrylonitrile butadiene styrene (ABS) as 
collaterals. In the worst scenario, John (2011) claimed that as much as 30 percent of 
China’s loans (2.5 trillion U.S. dollars) would be negatively impacted and potentially 
turned to non-performing loans. 
 
2.8Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have discussed the literature on the sovereign debt crisis in Latin 
American countries (including Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil), and European 
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countries (such as Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Ireland).In the 1980s, Mexico 
defaulted on its sovereign debt and this sovereign debt problem was transferred to 
other Latin American countries (such as Argentina and Brazil) in a short period, which 
started the “lost decade” of Latin America. Nevertheless, history tends to repeat itself 
and serious debt problems occurred again in the European countries (PIIGS countries) 
and slowed down the economic growth of the Eurozone and devalued the euro. This 
chapter also discussed the possible negative impacts of the sovereign debt crisis on 
countries’ overall economy: a sovereign debt crisis may lead to other crises such as a 
liquidity crisis, a bank crisis, and a currency crisis. Finally, this chapter discusses the 
Asian experience on the debt issue and provided an overview of China’s current 
sovereign debt problem. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology and Data 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the research method and data used in the current study. Section 
3.2 shows the variables and their data source and period. Models that are used to 
answer the objectives of this study are discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes 
the chapter. 
 
3.2 Variables and Data 
 
There are three generations of models that have been developed to explain financial 
crises (Fioramanti, 2008). The first generation models discuss the impact of exchange 
rates on currency, while the second generation models introduce speculation activities. 
In the first generation models, financial crises are caused by poor economic policies 
which cannot meet the purpose of a fixed exchange rate and lead to continuous losses 
in foreign reserves. When foreign reserves fall below a critical level, countries have to 
abandon the pegged exchange rate. As a consequence, a devaluation of the domestic 
currency may occur, which in turn starts a financial crisis. However, the model does 
not discuss the impact of speculations on foreign exchange rates. Therefore, the 
second generation models introduce speculations (such as self-fulfilling speculative 
attacks) into the model to explain the financial crisis. The second generation models, 
focusing on both governments and financial markets, describe the interactions 
between market participants’ and central bank’s decisions based on foreign exchange 
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rates (Blot, Ducoudre & Timbeau, 2016). Both models focus on currency crises. In 
order to investigate and explain the Latin American crises in the 1980s and the 1990s 
Asian crises, the third generation model was developed to explain a wider variety of 
crises such as bank crises and sovereign debt crises. The third generation models 
focus on the imbalance between financial factors, such as the moral hazard whereby 
the implicit government guarantee generates the “too big to fail” philosophy. Further, 
the lack of regulation in financial systems leads to over lending and/or over 
investment whereby external shocks can significantly decrease capital inflows 
(Fioramanti, 2008). For example, the over lending of investment banks and other 
financial institutions on sub-prime housing loans in the U.S., which due to the lack of 
regulation of sub-prime loan securities, led to the 2008 global financial crisis. Another 
example is the self-fulfilling model, whereby governments and banks have a large 
proportion of short-term maturity debts over total debts which potentially can lead to 
a liquidity run (Cole and Kehoe, 1996). Cole and Kehoe’s (1996) study shows that 
when the average debt maturity period is short (less than one year), debt crises can 
occur even under a low debt to GDP ratio (any level above 10%). 
 
Early studies on debt issues (such as Krueger, 1987; Euromoney, 1992; Kaminsky & 
Pereira, 1996) focused on the total amount of government external debts, foreign 
debts to GDP ratio and external debts to export ratio. For example, Krueger (1987) 
investigated the debt issue in 19 emerging countries, and found that debt growth plays 
an important role in determining debt crises. The author discusses how the gross debt 
built-up increases the government burden and also how the external debts to export 
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ratio decreases the ability of governments to repay loans. Overall, the debt level has a 
strong link to debt crises. The higher the debt level, the more risk the country has of 
falling into a debt crisis. In the recent studies (for example: Boonman et al., 2013; 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010), the positive impact of the debt burden on sovereign risk is 
still a big concern. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) tested the origin of debt crises based 
on a data set from over 70 countries globally and found that the increase in the debt 
burden can easily lead to a sovereign problem. In addition, Boonman et al. (2013) 
confirmed that the external debts to GDP ratio is one of the important determinants of 
sovereign crises based on a long-run study in Argentina from 1870 to 2012. 
 
Table 3.1 Debt Burden and Sovereign Risk 
Present value of debt as a percentage of 
Risk level Exports GDP Revenue 
Low 100 30 200 
Medium 150 40 250 
High 200 50 300 
Source: World Bank and IMF, 2008 
 
Researchers confronted new challenges in understanding sovereign debt problems 
when Mexico fell into a debt crisis during the period 1994-1995. Based on previous 
studies, debt crises can be explained by the debt burden. For example, the World Bank 
(see Table 3.1) pointed out that if the central government debt to GDP ratio exceeds 
50%, it may suggest a higher risk of one country falling into a debt problem. However, 
Mexico’s central government debts were just above 20% of the total GDP during the 
pre-crisis period, so the central government debt burden cannot explain the Mexico 
debt crisis in 1994. 
 54 
 
 
In order to explain why debt crises can potentially occur in a low debt burden country, 
researchers came up with a self-fulfilling model that not only captured the debt level 
but also introduced debt maturity as a determinant of debt crises. For example, Cole 
and Kehoe (1996) used a self-fulfilling model to study the Mexico debt crisis from 
1994 to 1995 and found significant impacts of external debts’ maturity length on 
sovereign debt crises. The authors explained that sovereign debt may fall into a 
position where the government can repay old loans if it can sell new debts; the 
government will default on sovereign debts if it cannot sell new debts. Cole and 
Kehoe (1996) named this sovereign debt interval as the crisis zone. The authors 
further explained that the sovereign debt crises risk is extremely high for a country 
under the crisis zone. Arteta and Hale (2008) believe that governments tend to serve 
existing debts until it is no longer possible, which may push up sovereign debts into 
the crisis zone. When the maturity of sovereign debts is short it means that the 
government has to raise a certain amount of funds in a shorter period to meet the 
required debt repayment, which is more difficult than in the longer period. As a result, 
Cole and Kehoe (1996) emphasized that the average length of government debts 
maturity essentially determines the size of the crisis zone, which significantly impacts 
sovereign debt risk. 
 
Similarly, Eichengreen and Mody (1999) introduced debt to GDP ratio, debt to export 
ratio, export growth and sovereign debt maturity length to investigate the debt 
sustainability. The authors confirmed that the average length of debt maturity has a 
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strong link with sovereign debt condition, which supported Cole and Kehoe’s (1996) 
findings. Based on Cole and Kehoe’s (1996) findings, a short average debt maturity 
length (shorter than one year) requires large amount of foreign reserves to repay debts 
in a short period compared to a longer debt maturity length. This significantly 
increases the demand for foreign currency, which may lead to a decrease in foreign 
exchange rates. The decrease in foreign exchange rates further increases the cost to 
repay external loans, thus governments may potentially decide to default on sovereign 
debts when the cost of sovereign debt repayments is too high. 
 
Recently, Desgranges and Rochon (2014) noticed that the sovereign debt burden and 
the sovereign debt maturity structure play important roles in controlling sovereign 
risks. The authors believe that a longer maturity length can help to hedge the risk of 
economic fundamentals’ uncertainty, which can decrease sovereign risks. Similarly, 
Niepelt (2014) confirmed that the sovereign debts’ maturity structure significantly 
impacts sovereign risks. The balance between long term and short term debts is 
important in controlling sovereign debt risks. 
 
In spite of the debt quality (debt-GDP ratio, debt-revenue ratio, sovereign debt 
maturity etc.), some other factors also significantly impact the sovereign debt 
condition. For example, Yue (2010) adopted external debt to GDP ratio, debt service 
to GDP ratio and interest rate to study sovereign defaults and debt renegotiations for 
emerging economies including Argentina. The author pointed out that the increase in 
interest rates raises the cost for governments to borrow new debts; consequently, 
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sovereign defaults might occur due to the extremely high credit price. Furthermore, 
the borrowing costs’ growth also affects companies and industries that need to raise 
money in the open market, which may directly impact government tax revenues and 
further decrease the debt affordability of the government. On the other hand, once the 
potential sovereign default or restructuring expectation exists, the credit supply will 
be directly impacted, which may lead to an increase in interest rates (Yue, 2010). 
 
Similarly, Holland, Kirby and Orazgani (2011) tested sovereign risks by studying the 
Eurozone countries’ interest liability burden. The authors found that sovereign 
defaults easily occur with large imbalances between governments’ debt burdens and 
revenues. Interest rate is one of the significant determinants of a sovereign debt 
burden (Holland, Kirby & Orazgani, 2011) and also impacts tax revenues dramatically 
(Yue, 2010). As a result, Holland et al., (2011) believe that interest rate is one of the 
important variables in testing sovereign debt risks. These findings also supported 
Yue’s (2010) study. 
 
According to Cantor and Packer (1996), income, economic growth and inflation also 
largely impact sovereign debt sustainability. According to the authors’ explanation, 
income determines the ability of a government to repay debts: a relatively higher 
economic growth rate suggests that the government can serve the debt burden more 
easily over time. In addition, inflation plays an important role in controlling sovereign 
risks. Thornton and Vasilakis (2016) found a lower inflation and a lower inflation 
uncertainty have a positive impact on sovereign risks based on 64 countries globally 
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from 1985 to 2012. 
 
Similarly, Fuertes and Kalotychou (2007) investigated sovereign debt risks based on a 
dataset of 75 emerging countries for the period from 1984 to 2000. The authors 
identified that variables such as government revenues, GDP growth, inflation, interest 
rate, average debt maturity and total debt to GDP ratio causally determine sovereign 
debt instabilities. 
 
Our study aims to investigate the sovereign debt risk in China. However, sovereign 
debt risk in a country cannot be observed directly; thus, estimators are needed to 
measure sovereign debt risk. According to Maltritz, Buhn and Eichler (2012) and 
Balima, Combes and Minea (2017), two indicators are widely used to estimate 
sovereign debt risk in the literature: yield spreads and sovereign ratings. Yield spreads 
are not suitable to investigate sovereign debt risk in China (details of reasons and 
results are provided in Appendix D); we use sovereign ratings alone to estimate 
Chinese sovereign debt risk in the current study. 
 
Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) tested sovereign debt risks in 47 
countries during the period from 1970 to 2002 and established an early warning 
system for sovereign debt crises. According to the authors, the Standard & Poor’s 
sovereign rating is widely used to measure sovereign debt risk (also see Fuertes & 
Kalotychou, 2007 and Fioramanti, 2008). Manasse et al. (2003) used a logistic model 
to test financial fundamentals’ impacts on the occurrence probability of a sovereign 
debt crisis. Based on the authors’ study, the logistic model can be treated as an early 
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warning system for countries’ debt risks; a probability larger than 0.5 is a clear signal 
that a sovereign debt problem is imminent. 
 
This current study tests sovereign debt risk in China (Standard & Poor’s sovereign 
rating) using macroeconomic fundamentals such as debt-GDP ratio, debt-revenue 
ratio, debt interest rate and inflation. Data are obtained from the World Bank 
(economic growth rate, exchange rate of Chinese RMB to the U.S. dollar and the U.S. 
treasure bond yield), the National Bureau of Statistics of China (inflation rate, interest 
rate, government bond yield, domestic government debt, foreign government debt, 
government revenue and government expenditure), Standard and Poor’s (S&P 
sovereign ratings) and annual reports of commercial banks in China (earnings per 
share, non-performing loan rate and capital adequacy ratio). 
 
In this study, we chose Chinese commercial banks only and exclude policy banks of 
China from our data set. Chinese policy banks are not profit-making-oriented but to 
fund the policy targets of the Chinese government; thus, the policy banks in China do 
not operate dependently. In addition, there are three different types of commercial 
banks in China: state-owned commercial banks; joint-equity commercial banks; and 
city/village and township banks. Unlike the former two bank types that operate widely 
at the national level, city/village and township banks operate in small areas, such as a 
city or a province; thus, city/village and township banks are also excluded from our 
study. 
 
The state-owned commercial banks are large sized banks; while non-state-owned 
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banks (joint-equity commercial banks) are small- and mid- sized banks. We select an 
equal amount of both state-owned commercial banks (Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Agriculture Bank 
of China) and non-state-owned commercial banks (China CITIC Bank, China 
Everbright Bank Co., Ltd, China Merchants Bank and Industrial Bank Co., Ltd), to 
avoid potential bias issue, such as bank type and size. An alternative way to avoid a 
potential bias from the bank type and size is to select all the commercial banks in the 
market (17 commercial banks operated nationally in China) while controlling the size 
(market share) of each bank (see Appendix E). 
 
Based on the data availability, official data of some macroeconomic factors before 
1996 are not available and only yearly data are available (such as China’s total debts, 
government revenues and government expenditures). Further, the 2008 financial crisis 
may have a significant impact on China’s sovereign debt risk due to the decrease in 
exports and dramatic increase in total government debts (China’s 4 trillion RMB 
economic stimulus package in 2008). In addition, the current study also aims to 
investigate the relationship between sovereign risk and banking risk in China. Many 
Chinese commercial banks’ annual reports are not available before 2006, especially 
for the joint-equity corporate commercial banks. 
 
Thus, the current study investigates the sovereign debt dynamics and sovereign risk of 
China based on yearly data from 1996 to 2014 and tests the relationship between 
sovereign risk and banking risk in China using yearly panel data from 2006 to 2014. 
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3.3 Models 
3.3.1 Debt Dynamics Model 
 
According to Fioramanti (2008), the imbalance of sovereign debts’ level and 
government budget is one of the important determinants of sovereign debt risks. A 
higher level of sovereign debt requires higher government budget restrictions which 
can weaken the sovereign debt sustainability. This is because the government needs 
fiscal surplus to repay sovereign debts and interests. The more debts a government has 
the more the government needs to repay in the future. This will challenge the 
government’s fiscal surplus and potentially generates a sovereign debt problem. 
 
China’s sovereign debts have increased dramatically in recent years. The total debt to 
GDP ratio in China was 187% at the end of 2012, and reached as high as 282% in 
2015. This ratio only numbered 105% in 2000. The significant increase in the debt 
burden of China may be due partly to the decrease in GDP growth, which decreased 
from 14.2% to 6.9% during 2007-2015 (the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis). 
More importantly, the government spending on a 4 trillion RMB economic stimulus 
package significantly attributed to the sharp increase in the debt burden of China, 
which may cause serious debt problems in China. As a result, the debt dynamics 
model in this study is aimed at testing how China’s central government debts change 
and its equilibrium dynamics. A larger gap between sovereign debts and equilibrium 
sovereign debts in China potentially suggests that a sovereign problem occurs. 
 
In order to estimate the sovereign debt dynamics, Pirtea et al. (2013) introduced an 
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empirical model (Equation 3.1) based on a government budget constraint equation. 
 
SD୲ 	ൌ 	 ሺE୲	– R୲ሻ ൅	ሺ1	 ൅ DIR୲ሻ ∗ DD୲ିଵ 	൅	ሺ1	 ൅ FIR୲ሻ ∗ FD୲ିଵ ∗ ER୲ ………	ሺ3.1ሻ	
 
Equation (3.1) captures the variation of sovereign debts at time T, SDt, which is based 
on government expenditure during period T, Et, government revenue during period T, 
Rt, debt interest rates of domestic debts and foreign debts, DIRt and FIRt, economic 
growth during period T, EGt, the exchange rate of domestic currency to foreign 
currency (U.S. dollars), ERt, and sovereign debts at time T-1, domestic debts DDt-1 
and foreign debts FDt-1. 
 
Economic growth plays an important role in measuring sovereign debts. The debt to 
GDP ratio captures the debt burden of a country, which strongly impacts the country’s 
sovereign risk. The amount of sovereign debts alone is generally meaningless without 
the GDP scale due to the large size difference among countries’ economies. Adding 
economic growth into equation (3.1), the sovereign debt dynamics become a function 
of macroeconomic fundamentals such as government expenditure, government 
revenue, existing sovereign domestic debts, existing sovereign foreign debts, domestic 
debt interest rate, foreign debt interest rate and exchange rate. Government 
expenditure and economic growth increase sovereign debts; while government 
revenue, debt interest rates (domestic and foreign), existing sovereign debts (domestic 
and foreign) and exchange rate negatively impact sovereign debts. Thus, this study 
uses an OLS regression model in equation (3.2) to test the sovereign debt dynamics in 
China. 
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SD୲ ൌ α ൅ βଵDD୲ିଵ ൅ βଶFD୲ିଵ ൅ βଷR୲ ൅ βସE୲ ൅ βହEXL୲ ൅ β଺EG୲ ൅ β଻DIR୲ ൅ β଼FIR୲ ൅ ε…… . ሺ3.2ሻ	
Table 3.2 presents the definitions of the variables in equations (3.1) and (3.2) 
 
Table 3.2 Variables and Measurements (for equations3.1 and3.2) 
 Variables Measurements 
E Expenditure Growth Chinese central government expenditures growth rate 
R Revenue Growth Chinese central government revenues growth rate 
SD Sovereign Debt Growth Chinese central government total debts growth rate 
DD Domestic Debt Growth Chinese central government domestic debts growth rate 
FD Foreign DebtGrowth Chinese central government foreign debts growth rate 
ER Exchange Rate Yearly exchange Rates of RMB to US dollars 
EG Economic Growth Chinese yearly GDP growth 
EXL Exchange Losses/Gains on 
External Debts 
The changes of foreign debts interest based on exchange 
rate changes 
DIR Domestic Interest Rate Chinese central bank basis one year lending rates 
FIR Foreign Interest Rate US Loan Prime Rates 
 
In the literature, debt interest rate and government deficit significantly increase the 
sovereign debt burden (Genberg & Sulstarova, 2008; Tielens, Van Aarle & Van Hove, 
2014). Existing sovereign debt levels in previous time periods (outstanding debts that 
have not been paid back) tend to decrease the sovereign debt borrowing (Pirtea et al., 
2013). GDP growth has a positive impact on sovereign debts (Fan & Lv, 2012; Xu & 
Zhang, 2014). The increase in foreign exchange rates will decrease the interest on 
foreign debts in the domestic currency, which helps to decrease sovereign foreign 
debts (Pirtea et al., 2013; Kinoshita, 2006). 
 
Accordingly, the sovereign debt dynamics are determined by the debt interest rate, 
GDP growth rate, capital gains or losses on foreign debt, government revenue and 
government expenditure. Therefore, we can estimate the equilibrium sovereign debt 
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by using the economic fundamentals such as interest rate, GDP growth, foreign 
exchange, government expenditure and revenue based on equation (3.2). 
 
The sovereign debt dynamics model (Equation 3.2) allows us to capture the 
equilibrium sovereign debt dynamics based on economic fundamentals (Pirtea et al., 
2013). To compare the regression result of equation (3.2) with the real sovereign debt 
level of China, we can address how much sovereign debt of China deviates from its 
equilibrium which can measure the sovereign debt risk in China. 
 
3.3.2 Sovereign Risk Model 
 
In order to test sovereign debt risks and predict potential sovereign debt crises in a 
country, Manasse et al. (2003) used a logistic model (Equation 3.3) to test financial 
fundamentals’ impacts on the risk of a sovereign debt crisis based on a data set of 47 
countries during the period from 1970 to 2002. The authors believe that the logistic 
model can predict countries’ debt risks, whereby a probability (calculated based on 
logistic model results) larger than 0.5 clearly signals that a sovereign debt problem is 
imminent. 
 
Pt = f (SRt-1 *Xt-1; (1 –SRt-1) *Xt-1).................................................................... (3.3) 
 
Equation (3.3) measures sovereign risks at time T, Pt, based on a binary logistic model, 
which captures the probability (0 to 1) of sovereign risks, Pt. When the estimated Pt 
falls into 0.5-1, a sovereign debt crisis will occur; otherwise, a sovereign debt crisis 
will not occur at time T. The sovereign risk model measures sovereign risks based on 
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the Standard & Poor’s indicator at time T-1, SRt-1, and explanatory variables X at 
time T-1, Xt-1. The explanatory variables X represent the country’s economic 
fundamentals such as sovereign debt to GDP ratio, sovereign debt to revenue ratio, 
debt rates, GDP growth and inflation index. 
 
The logistic model (Equation 3.3) predicts the probability of sovereign debt 
crises/defaults based on the Standard & Poor’s indicator and macroeconomic 
variables such as sovereign debt burden, debt affordability, debt interest rates, 
economic growth and inflation. However, the model (Equation 3.3) can only be used 
to predict the sovereign crises’ occurrence (0 or 1), which does not capture the 
sovereign risk level and provide a warning to the government when the sovereign risk 
level is getting larger. 
 
Therefore, based on the binary logistic model (Equation 3.3) this current study uses an 
ordered logistic model to measure sovereign risk (Equation 3.4). The Standard & 
Poor’s sovereign rating is widely used to measure sovereign risk in the literature 
(Manasse et al., 2003; Maltritz et al., 2012). Following the literature, this study uses 
the Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating to measure sovereign risk in equation (3.4). 
Further, by adopting the Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating as the sovereign risk 
measurement, the current study can separate the sovereign debt risk level based on the 
explanatory variables X into 6 ordered grades which meet the Standard & Poor’s 
sovereign rating: top grade (AAA), high quality grade (AA+, AA, AA-), upper 
medium quality grade (A+, A, A-), medium quality grade (BBB+, BBB, BBB-), 
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non-investment grade (from BB+ to C) and default grade (SD and D). Based on 
equation (3.4), expanding the explanatory variables X, the ordered logistic regression 
model can be rewritten as the sovereign risk model (Equation 3.5). 
 
SR୲ 	ൌ 	α	 ൅ eஒଡ଼౪షభ 	൅ ε. . . . . . ………………………………… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ሺ3.4ሻ	
logitሺSR୲ሻ ൌ 	α	 ൅ βଵDB୲ିଵ 	൅ βଶDA୲ିଵ 	൅ βଷDR୲ିଵ 	൅ βସIF୲ିଵ 	൅ βହEG୲ିଵ 	൅ ε…… . . ሺ3.5ሻ	
Table 3.3 presents the definitions of the variables in equations (3.4) to (3.5) 
 
Table 3.3 Variables and Measurements (for equations3.4, 3.5, and 3.6) 
 Variables Measurements 
X Explanatory Variables (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5)  
X1(DB) Debt Burden Debt-GDP Ratio of China 
X2(DA) Debt Affordability Debt-Revenue Ratio of China 
X3(DR) Debt Rate Chinese central bank basis Lending Rate 
X4(IF) Inflation China’s CPI 
X5(EG) Economic Growth China’s GDP Growth Index 
SR Sovereign Risk S&P Sovereign Ratings of China 
 
In the sovereign risk model (Equation 3.5), debt-GDP ratio (World Bank, 2008; 
Eichengreen & Mody, 1999; Yue, 2010), debt- revenue ratio (Manasse et al., 2003; 
Holland, Kirby & Orazgani, 2011) and debt rates (Moorad, 2010; Yue, 2010) 
positively impact the sovereign risk grade (increase sovereign risk); GDP growth 
(Cantor & Packer, 1996; Pirtea, Nicolescu & Mota, 2013) and CPI (Fuertes & 
Kalotychou, 2007; Roberts, Kranzler & Williams, 2014) decrease sovereign risk. 
 
The World Bank (2008) suggested the debt-GDP ratio is an important signal of 
sovereign risk as a central government debt-GDP ratio that is higher than 50% may 
lead to instability in a country’s sovereign risk. Yue (2010) founds that a higher debt 
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burden level potentially increases credit prices; the government may not afford to 
borrow in the market to rollover existing sovereign debts, which may lead to a 
sovereign default. 
 
The continued imbalance between sovereign debts and revenues create an 
increasingly high debt-revenue ratio of a country, which can easily lead to a sovereign 
default (Holland, Kirby & Orazgani, 2011). Similarly, Manasse et al. (2003) 
confirmed the significant impact of debt-revenue ratio on sovereign risk based on an 
empirical study of 47 countries globally from 1970 to 2002. 
 
Sovereign debts include government loans (floating rates) and government bonds 
(fixed rates). The change in debt interest rates directly impacts sovereign loans at 
floating rates, which significantly impacts sovereign risk (Yue, 2010). Indirectly, debt 
interest rates’ changes may impact the sovereign bond value, which has an impact on 
the country’s sovereign risk (Moorad, 2010). 
 
According to Cantor and Packer (1996), a higher economic growth helps the 
government to serve sovereign debts over time, which in turn decreases sovereign risk 
(also see Pirtea et al., 2013). This may be due to economic growth potentially 
increasing government revenues and decreasing the sovereign debt burden. 
 
The change in inflation potentially impacts the value of existing foreign sovereign 
debts. This is due to inflation, which can influence the domestic currency value; when 
CPI increases, the domestic currency may devalue (Fuertes and Kalotychou 2007). 
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The currency devaluation has a negative impact on external debts due to foreign 
exchange rate losses and a positive impact on domestic debts due to the decrease in 
real interest rate (interest rate – inflation rate). Thus, CPI may decrease sovereign risk 
in China (domestic debts dominated over 99.6% of total government debts in 2014). 
 
Based on Manasse et al’s (2003) study, the logistic model has the ability to predict the 
likelihood of sovereign debt problems in China. According to the sovereign risk 
model (Equation 3.5), the sovereign debt risk at time T can be estimated by 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as debt-GDP ratio, debt-revenue ratio, debt rates, 
GDP growth and inflation during time period T-1. Manasse et al. (2003) assumed that 
the logistic model can serve as an important early warning system for sovereign debt 
crises. The Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating estimates countries’ risks and is 
calculated based on countries’ previous macroeconomic fundamentals; as a result, the 
use of present macroeconomic fundamentals (during the time period T) can somehow 
predict the Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating in the future (at time T+1). Thus, by 
using the Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating in measuring sovereign risk, the 
sovereign risk model can serve as an early warning system model in China. 
 
Our study will investigate sovereign debt risk in China using the sovereign risk model 
(Equation 3.5). This model not only tests how macroeconomic fundamentals impact 
sovereign debt risk, but also predicts the possibility of a potential sovereign debt crisis 
occurring in China. 
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3.3.3 Bank Risk Model 
 
Buch, Koetter and Ohls (2013) studied the linkage between bank risk and sovereign 
debt risk based on a quarterly data set of 1898 German banks during the period from 
2004 to 2010. The authors found that before the crisis period, investments in 
sovereign bonds tend to decrease bank risk; however, holding large amounts of 
sovereign bonds significantly increases bank risk after a sovereign crisis occurs in 
such countries. As a result, the authors concluded that government bond risks are 
strongly linked to aggregate bank risks. 
 
Similarly, Gennaioli et al., (2014) confirmed the significant impact of sovereign risk 
on banks, based on 191 countries’ data from 1998 to 2012. The authors argued that the 
factors which impact bank risk include the bank characteristics such as bank 
performance, bank ownership and capital adequacy; and country economic 
environmental factors such as economic growth, inflation and sovereign risk. 
 
This current study aims to investigate the impact of sovereign risk on the financial 
system particularly banks. Equation (3.6) is the bank risk model in this study which 
tests the impact of sovereign risk and other macroeconomic fundamentals, such as 
economic growth, inflation, debt rates, capital adequacy ratio, earnings per share, 
non-performing loan rate and state ownership on the banking risk in China. 
 
Z୲ ൌ α	 ൅ βଵEG୲ 	൅ βଶSR୲ 	൅ βଷIF୲ 	൅ βସGDY୲ 	൅ βହPS୲ 	൅ β଺DL୲ ൅ β଻CAR୲ ൅ β଼BO
൅ β଼Year	 ൅ ε………………………………………………………… . ሺ3.6ሻ	
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Table 3.4 presents the definitions of the variables in equation (3.6) 
 
Table 3.4 Variables and Measurements (for equation 3.6) 
 Variables Measurements 
Z Banking Risk Z-score (calculated by equation 2 
below) 
SR Sovereign Risk S&P sovereign rating of China 
IF Inflation CPI of China 
EG Economic Growth GDP Growth of China 
GDY Government Debt Yield Domestic Debt Yield of banks 
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio Capital Adequacy Ratio of banks 
PS Earnings per Share Yearly profit per share of banks 
DL Non-performing Loan Rate Non-performing loan rate of banks 
Year Year effect of data set period (2006-2014) captured by ordered categories 
(1-9) referring to year (2006-2014), respectively 
BO Dummy variable (bank ownership) captures whether the bank is owned by 
government (0 or 1) 
 
The dependent variable Zt in equation (3.6) is the Z-score, which is widely used to 
capture bank risks such as bank performance, profitability and volatility (Buch et al., 
2013; Beck, Laeven, Levine & Pennacchi, 2008; Laeyen & Levine, 2009). The 
Z-Score is calculated based on some fundamentals such as capital-asset ratio, ROA, 
return on assets, E/A, and standard deviation of assets return, σROA, shown in 
equation (3.7). 
 
Z	 ൌ 	 ሺ
E Aൗ 	൅ 	ROAሻ
σୖ୓୅
…… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …………… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ሺ3.7ሻ	
 
Based on equation (3.6), our study will estimate how macroeconomic fundamentals 
such as economic growth, inflation, sovereign risk, debt rates and bank characteristics 
including capital adequacy ratio, profit per share, dead loan rate and state ownership 
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impact on bank risk (Z-Score). More importantly, Z-score (Equation 3.7) is calculated 
by the capital-asset ratio return on assets and the standard deviation of assets return. A 
higher Z-score suggests lower bank risks. 
 
In the literature, economic growth significantly decreases bank risks (Levine, 1998). 
During an economic boom period, credit demands will increase, which in turn leads 
creditors (including banks) to have more optional choices to implement strict credit 
rationing. This can decrease the credit risk of banks. 
 
According to Gennaioli et al. (2014), sovereign risk significantly impacts the return 
on government debt through two channels. The first is the saleable government bond, 
where a sovereign debt problem decreases the government bonds’ market price. 
Second, the sovereign debt issue may lead to debt default, restructure or rollover 
which can impact the return on unsaleable government debts. Thus, sovereign risk can 
significantly affect bank risk (Z-Score) based on equation (3.7), through its impact on 
government debt returns (one of the combinations of the return on assets of banks). 
 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) noticed that inflation increases the fee-income 
share (the ratio of non-interest income over total operating income) and the 
non-deposit fund share (the ratio of non-deposit funds over total deposits and 
short-term funds), which will decrease bank stability and increase bank risk. 
 
Sovereign debt rates positively impact the Z-score. Higher debt rates increase the 
return on government debts held by banks, which increases the profitability of banks; 
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this helps to reduce bank risk (Kohler, 2012). 
 
Profit per share captures bank profitability and the capital adequacy ratio measures 
bank stability; these two variables positively impact bank performance, which 
decrease bank risk (Kohler, 2012; Mergaerts & Vennet, 2016). The increase in dead 
loan rate (non-performing loan rate) significantly decreases bank performance and 
bank efficiency, which increase bank risk (Li et al., 2009). 
 
Bank ownership plays an important role in testing bank risk. Bonin, Hasan and 
Wachtel (2005) found that government-owned banks have a relatively higher return 
on equity than joint-equity corporate banks. This suggests the positive impact of bank 
ownership on bank profitability, which helps to reduce bank risk. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Chapter Three discussed the data and methodology used in this current study. The 
chapter discussed three models used to capture the three objectives of the study. This 
study used the debt dynamic model (Equation 3.2) to address how much the sovereign 
debt of China deviates from its equilibrium; employs the sovereign risk model 
(Equation 3.5) to test the impact of economic fundamentals on sovereign risk of China; 
and introduces the bank risk model (Equation 3.6) to estimate the effects of sovereign 
risk on bank risk in China. The chapter also discussed the data, time period and 
variables used in the models. The results of the models will be presented in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results and findings of the present study. Section 4.2 
provides the regression results of the debt dynamics model. The results for the 
sovereign risk model are presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 provides the results and 
findings of the bank risk model and Section 4.5 summarises the findings of the 
empirical analyses. 
 
4.2 Results of the Debt Dynamics Model 
 
The debt dynamics model (equation 3.2) captures the relationship between sovereign 
debt dynamics and economic fundamentals in China. The economic fundamentals 
include domestic debt growth, foreign debt growth, government expenditure, 
government revenue, economic growth, domestic debt interest rate, foreign debt 
interest rate and foreign exchange losses/gains. This model is a linear model and is 
estimated by the least squares method. The estimated results of the debt dynamics 
model are presented in Table 4.1. The coefficients and significances of each variable 
will be discussed in this section. 
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Table 4.1 Determinants of Sovereign Debt Dynamics of China 
Variable Coefficient Estimates 
Domestic Debt Growth(t-1) -0.433** 
(-2.845) 
Foreign Debt Growth(t-1) 0.582 
(0.797) 
Government Expenditure 6.218*** 
(3.640) 
Government Revenue 0.504 
(0.273) 
Economic Growth 2.030** 
(2.270) 
Domestic Debt Interest Rate -16.020** 
(-2.369) 
Foreign Debt Interest Rate -0.082 
(-0.166) 
Foreign Exchange Losses -3.43E-05 
(-1.432) 
Number of observations 19 
R-squared 0.700 
F-statistic (p-value) 0.086* 
Durbin-Watson test 2.206 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below the estimates. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. F-statistic presents the joint significance of 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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4.2.1 Sovereign Debt Condition 
 
The debt dynamics model tests how the sovereign debt condition in the last period 
((t-1) represents the last term in the debt dynamics model) impacts on the sovereign 
debt in the current term. Specifically, the debt dynamics model (equation 3.2) 
investigates the impact of existing government debts on the sovereign debt in China 
for the current year based on the yearly data. 
 
The sovereign debt condition of the last term is separated into two parts: domestic 
debt growth and foreign debt growth. The domestic debt growth (t-1) is statistically 
significant at the 5% level and has a negative (-0.433) effect on sovereign debts (see 
Table 4.1). This suggests that if the domestic debt growth (t-1) increases by 1%, it will 
decrease sovereign debt growth by 0.433%. Pirtea et al. (2013) argued that a higher 
existing sovereign debt level may generate a higher sovereign risk, which decreases 
the new government bond issues. 
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Table 4.2 Sovereign Debt Statistics of China 1995-2014 
Year Total debt (trillion) Domestic debt (trillion) Domestic debt/Total debt 
1995 0.69 0.68 98.87% 
1996 0.76 0.75 98.83% 
1997 0.92 0.91 98.95% 
1998 0.96 0.95 98.87% 
1999 1.79 1.78 99.32% 
2000 2.35 2.33 99.46% 
2001 3.02 3.01 99.60% 
2002 3.56 3.54 99.60% 
2003 4.18 4.16 99.66% 
2004 4.67 4.65 99.66% 
2005 5.01 4.99 99.57% 
2006 5.37 5.35 99.56% 
2007 5.65 5.62 99.54% 
2008 7.49 7.46 99.64% 
2009 7.12 7.09 99.63% 
2010 8.19 8.17 99.65% 
2011 16.98 16.95 99.79% 
2012 15.67 15.63 99.72% 
2013 15.29 15.24 99.70% 
2014 14.26 14.20 99.63% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
As one of the important measurements of a country’s debt condition, domestic debt 
can capture the debt burden of the country. For example, the domestic debt of China 
occupies more than 98% of the total sovereign debt (see Table 4.2). The large 
proportion of domestic debts over total debts (approximately 99%) enables the 
Chinese government to make decisions about issuing new debts entirely based on the 
existing domestic debt condition. Pirtea et al. (2013) suggest that the existing debt 
level significantly impacts the debt dynamics in a country; thus, the Chinese 
government may decrease or even stop borrowing when the domestic debt growth (t-1) 
is extremely high. This contributes to the negative impact of the domestic debt growth 
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(t-1) on the sovereign debt growth in China (see Table 4.1). 
 
The result shows the impact of foreign debt growth on sovereign debt growth in China 
is not significant because the domestic debt dominates the sovereign debt in China 
(the ratio of domestic debts over total sovereign debts in China was over 98% during 
1995-2014). This means the foreign debt condition has an extremely low impact on 
the total debt. Further, China’s foreign reserves at the end of 2014 were as high as 
USD3,843 billion which equals RMB23,519 billion. Based on the data in Table 4.2, 
the foreign debt of China at the end of 2014 was RMB5,300 billion which was 
approximately 22% of China’s foreign reserves. This suggests that the Chinese 
government may ignore the impact of foreign debt condition when making decisions 
about issuing new sovereign debts since it is relatively easy to use foreign reserves to 
repay foreign debts. Similarly, Rodrik’s (2007) study claims that, based on the IMF 
study, holding a certain amount of foreign reserves helps to reduce the risk of foreign 
debts, especially for developing countries. Rodrik believes the level of foreign 
reserves that the country needs to hold significantly depends on the external debt size. 
This may explain the insignificant impact of the foreign debt (-1) on sovereign debts 
in China. 
 
Pirtea et al. (2013) investigated the sovereign debt dynamics of Romania from 2000 to 
2011 and confirmed that lagged public debt condition significantly impacted the 
sovereign debt dynamics in Romania. The authors found that temporary expectations 
significantly impact sovereign debt changes, especially after a financial crisis breaks 
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out (such as the 2008 global financial crisis). This finding supports the results of the 
debt dynamics model (equation 3.2) that the massive government debt of China 
(mainly caused by the economic stimulus program in 2008) creates negative 
expectations which cause the Chinese government to decrease borrowing in the open 
market to avoid an increase in sovereign debt risk. 
 
4.2.2 Government Budget Conditions 
 
The debt dynamics model (equation 3.2) also discusses how government budget 
conditions impact on sovereign debt dynamics in China. The government budget is 
based on two fundamentals: government expenditure and government revenue. 
 
The government expenditure is significant at the 1% level and positively (6.218) 
impacts the sovereign debt in China, while the coefficient of the government revenue 
is insignificant in the debt dynamics model. This implies that if we only consider the 
impact of the government budget, China’s sovereign debt dynamics are mainly 
affected by government spending. If the Chinese government expenditure increases 
by 1%, the sovereign debt will increase by 6.218%. 
 
According to Pirtea et al. (2013), government expenditures have a significant impact 
on the fluctuation of sovereign debts. The evidence can be found in China’s massive 
economic stimulus package, which was implemented in 2008. The Chinese 
government spent 4 trillion RMB on several infrastructure projects, such as public 
transport (particularly the high-speed railway), real estate and the 2008 Wenchuan 
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earthquake recovery. As a result, the sovereign debt (especially local government debt) 
increased dramatically (Fan & Lv, 2012). 
 
Pirtea et al.’s study (2013) is supported by an earlier study (Fioramanti, 2008). 
Fioramanti (2008) investigated the sovereign debt changes in 46 emerging countries 
from 1980 to 2004 and found a strong relationship between government expenditures 
and sovereign debt dynamics. The rise in the government spending increases the 
government deficit, which may require the government to borrow more credit in the 
open market to balance the government budget in the long run. 
 
Theoretically, the increase in government revenues increases the sovereign debt 
affordability and has a positive impact on sovereign debt dynamics. However, in the 
debt dynamics model (equation 3.2) the positive coefficient is not statistically 
significant. The insignificant impact of government revenues on sovereign debt 
dynamics in China could be attributed to the high economic growth in the long run 
(averaging over 10% per year since the 1980s) that creates positive expectations on 
future government revenues. Further, in China’s tax system, the land-remising fee, 
one of the main financial sources of the Chinese government, is not included in the 
government revenue calculation. Chinese governments, especially local governments, 
use the land-remising fee as collaterals when borrowing credits from banks. For 
example, Wu and Feng (2014) observed that over 40% of the local government loans 
in China were guaranteed by the land-remising fee. As a result, government revenues 
may somehow not significantly impact the sovereign debt dynamics in China. 
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4.2.3 Economic Growth 
 
Economic growth has a positive impact on sovereign debt dynamics in the debt 
dynamics model and is significant at the 5% level. Economic growth is an important 
determinant of the sovereign debt risk. The weight of sovereign debts over GDP is 
widely used to capture the country’s debt burden (see Section 3.2). To avoid a 
potential sovereign crisis, the government may keep the debt burden under a critical 
level (50% as suggested by the IMF and the World Bank). A higher GDP allows the 
government to borrow more from the credit market without having to increase the 
debt burden. Therefore, economic growth has a positive impact on sovereign debt 
dynamics. 
 
Our finding is supported by Fan and Lv (2012). The authors tested the public debt, the 
fiscal prudence and the growth sustainability in China, and reported that an increase in 
sovereign debts in China is closely related to high economic growth. On the other 
hand, the growth in sovereign debts also creates a higher employment rate and 
opportunities in the heavy industry (benefits by government investments in the real 
estate market and high-speed train projects) that further increase the GDP of China. 
Similarly, Xu and Zhang (2014) investigated China’s sovereign debt risks from 2000 
to 2012. The authors argued that high economic growth has a significant impact on 
the sovereign debts of China since the economic growth helps to repay sovereign 
debts. 
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4.2.4 Interest of Debts 
 
The interest of sovereign debts including domestic debts interest and foreign debts 
interest depends on three fundamentals: domestic debt interest rates, foreign debt 
interest rates and foreign exchange losses/gains based on exchange rate dynamics. 
 
Domestic debt interest rate significantly and negatively impacts (at the 5% 
significance level) sovereign debt dynamics (see Table 4.1). This suggests that when 
the domestic debt rate increases by 1%, the sovereign debt will decrease by 16.02%. 
The negative relationship between domestic debt rates and sovereign debt dynamics is 
due to the increase in credit costs. Interest rate determines credit costs for borrowers. 
Moreover, credit costs strongly impact the borrowers’ decision on raising money in 
the credit market. The increase in domestic debt rates raises the credit cost of 
borrowing domestically, and this increases the credit price, which in turn decreases 
the new sovereign debt issuance. Further, for some existing sovereign debts that have 
a floating rate, the increase in interest rates will also increase the debt cost of existing 
debts. Similarly, Paesani, Strauch, and Kremer (2006) found that the country’s total 
debt is significantly impacted by interest rates in the long run based on the data from 
Germany, Italy, and the U.S. 
 
Foreign debt rates and exchange losses show an insignificant impact on sovereign 
debt dynamics in the model. The extremely small foreign debt amount and the large 
number of foreign exchange reserves in China contribute to the insignificant 
coefficients. Based on the data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (see Table 
 81 
 
4.2), the foreign debt occupies less than 2% of China’s total sovereign debts. Further, 
China’s foreign exchange reserves numbered over USD3800 billion by the end of 
2014. This may cause the sovereign debt dynamics in China to be insensitive to 
changes in foreign debt rates and exchange rates. Similarly, Johnston (2016) noticed 
that the sovereign debt risk in China heavily depended on domestic debts and 
domestic debt rates due to the low external debt level (0.37% of total government 
debts at the end of 2014). 
 
Kinoshita (2006) tested the relationship between interest rates and government debts 
using a data set of 19 OECD countries from 1971 to 2004. The author found a strong 
relationship between interest rates and sovereign debts. Further, Pirtea et al. (2013) 
confirmed the strong impact of interest rates on sovereign debt dynamics and believed 
that reducing the interest rate risk is one of the critical factors to manage the public 
debt. Further, the authors also pointed out that the government may target to increase 
the domestic debt weight of sovereign debts in order to limit the currency risk of the 
sovereign debt portfolio, which may support the insignificant impacts of foreign debt 
rates and exchange losses on sovereign debts in the debt dynamics model. 
 
4.2.5 Durbin-Watson Test 
 
The Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic tests for the first-order autocorrelation in the error 
term in a model. The D-W statistic ranges between 0 and 4; a model does not suffer 
from autocorrelation when the D-W statistic is close to 2. This study used the time 
series data in the debt dynamics model; therefore, it is important to test the 
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autocorrelation. According to Ostrom (1978), the non-autocorrelation is one of the 
assumptions of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and the time series data 
routinely lead to a violation of such assumption. In addition, autocorrelation occurs in 
the time-series data when a model is mis-specified which means that some 
independent variables can explain the dependent variable, but are not included in the 
model (Ostrom, 1978). 
 
The results in the debt dynamics model (see Table 4.1) show the Durbin-Watson value 
is 2.206 and the critical value of the D-W statistics (dU) is 2.668. The D-W value 
(2.206) is between 4-dU (1.332) and dU (2.668), which suggests the debt dynamics 
model does not suffer from autocorrelation issues. The result of the D-W test shows 
our debt dynamics model is not mis-specified. 
 
4.2.6 Debt Dynamics Model Discussion 
 
The debt dynamics model (Equation 3.2) in our study investigates the sovereign debt 
changes in China against the macroeconomic fundamental variables such as domestic 
debts, foreign debts, expenditures, revenues, GDP growth, domestic debt interest rates, 
foreign debt interest rates and foreign exchange losses/gains. The equilibrium 
sovereign debt index of China can be calculated based on the model estimates (see 
Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 China’s Sovereign Debt and Equilibrium Sovereign Debt 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the dynamics of the sovereign debt index and the equilibrium 
sovereign debt index in China. Both index lines indicate the increase rate of sovereign 
debt level and their equilibrium level. The large gap between the sovereign debt index 
and its equilibrium value suggests that a sovereign debt problem exists in China. 
China’s 2008 economic stimulus package required the Chinese government to spend 
RMB4 trillion in infrastructure and public transport projects in order to maintain 
China’s GDP growth during the 2008 global financial crisis period, which 
significantly increased the sovereign debt index since 2009. From 2009 to 2012, 
China’s sovereign debts surged almost 1.5 times (Li, 2013). The increase in China’s 
sovereign debts is mainly attributed to the government over spending (Fan & Lv, 
2012). Consequently, China’s sovereign debt index nearly exceeded its equilibrium 
value by 25% during the period 2009-2013. 
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This large gap between the debt growth of Chinese central government and its 
equilibrium value confirms a sovereign debt problem in China since 2009, especially 
after the Chinese government implemented the RMB4 trillion economic stimulus 
program in 2008. This is because the stimulus package invested in many areas which 
generated low returns (such as transport, electricity, and housing areas) (Li, 2013) and 
the RMB4 trillion program has been adjusted in 2010. The new version of the 
stimulus program included wider investment areas (such as inner-city transport, 
infrastructure, and environmental protection projects) and a larger investment size. By 
the end of 2012, the actual total spending of the Chinese government totalled RMB30 
trillion, which was about 6 times more than the original stimulus plan in 2008 (Zhang, 
2013a).In addition, the average growth of Chinese sovereign debts also shows the 
significant impact of the RMB4 trillion program: the five-year average increases in 
Chinese sovereign debt before and after the economic stimulus package (2004-2008 
and 2009-2013) are 14.98% and 39.15%, respectively. This significant difference 
between the sovereign debt growth in China before and after the RMB4 trillion 
program suggests the dramatic impact of the economic stimulus program on the 
changes in the growth of Chinese sovereign debts.  
 
4.3 Results of the Sovereign Risk Model 
 
The sovereign risk model (equation 3.5) of the present study tests how 
macroeconomic fundamental variables impact China’s sovereign risk via an ordered 
logistic model. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the independent variables in the 
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sovereign risk model are in lagged term. For example, to capture the sovereign risk in 
time T, the model uses macroeconomic fundamental variables in time T-1. The 
estimated results in the sovereign risk model are presented in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Results of the Sovereign Risk Model (An Ordered Logistic Model) 
Variable Coefficient Estimates 
Debt-revenue ratio 1.174*** 
(2.732) 
Debt-GDP ratio 22.796*** 
(3.641) 
Debt interest rate 98.032*** 
(20.596) 
Economic Growth -4.47E-05*** 
(-3.226) 
Inflation -15.880*** 
(-22.741) 
Limit Points 
Limit_3 787.5036 
Limit_4 936.6469 
Number of observations 19 
Pseudo R-square 1.000 
LR-statistic (p-value) 0.000*** 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below the estimates. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. LR-statistic presents the joint significance of 
the sovereign risk model. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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4.3.1 Sovereign Risk 
 
According to Manasse et al. (2003), the Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating is one of 
the important measurements of the sovereign risk. Manasse et al. argue that the 
Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating is related to the countries’ macroeconomic 
fundamental variables such as economic growth, inflation and public debt services, 
with the aim to capture a county’s debt risk. The higher the Standard & Poor’s 
sovereign rating (the highest rating is AAA, the lowest ratings are D and SD) for a 
country, the lower the sovereign risk in the country. Maltritz et al. (2012) successfully 
employed the Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating as one of the sovereign risk 
indicators in modelling the sovereign debt risk based on an annual data set of 31 
countries from 1994 to 2006. The authors argue that a country’s default risk cannot be 
directly observed, thus researchers should use indicators such as issuance spreads, 
spreads on secondary bond markets, the Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating and the 
Moody’s sovereign ratings to estimate the sovereign risk. The Standard & Poor’s 
sovereign rating is one of the most effective indicators for the sovereign risk 
approximation. 
 
Based on the target of the Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating, the sovereign risk can 
be divided into six grades: the top grade (AAA), the high quality grade (AA+, AA, 
AA-), the upper medium quality grade (A+, A, A-), the medium quality grade (BBB+, 
BBB, BBB-), the non-investment grade (from BB+ to C) and the default grade (SD 
and D). The present study uses six categories (1-6) to represent six sovereign risk 
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grades (the top grade to the default grade), respectively (such as the top grade ranked 
1, the high quality grade ranked 2, etc). This suggests that the higher rank category 
exhibits the higher sovereign risk (for example category 4 yields a higher debt risk 
versus category 3). Based on the data of the sovereign risk model, China’s sovereign 
risk fell into categories 2 to 4 during the period 1995 - 2014. 
 
In a binary logistic regression model, the dependent variable is a probability of the 
study event; the value of the dependent variable is between 0 and 1. The result of a 
binary logistic regression model has only one limit point (0.5). When the probability 
falls into 0-0.5, the study event does not occur (the probability equals 0); otherwise, 
the model treats the study event with certainty (the probability equals 1). An ordered 
logistic regression model divides a binary probability (0 or 1) into more than two 
ordered categories such as small-middle-large, bad-good-excellent, etc. Limit points 
in an ordered logistic regression model’s result are cut-off points, which define where 
one category ends and the other begins. The results of the sovereign risk model (see 
Table 4.3) show two limit points: the limit_3 (787.5036) and the limit_4 (936.6469). 
These two limit points divide the sovereign risk into three areas (less than limit_3, 
between limit_3 and limit_4, larger than limit_4), which represent the three risk level 
categories (2, 3, 4), respectively. For example, if the estimated sovereign risk (using 
the independent variables and their coefficients) at time T is less than limit_3, it 
suggests that China has a lower sovereign risk (risk level 2) at time T. 
 
 
 
 88 
 
4.3.2 Debt Affordability 
 
Debt affordability (debt to revenue ratio) captures the ability of the loan repayment; a 
higher debt to revenue ratio suggests a lower ability to repay the debt. This is due to 
government revenues pledge to the government debt repayment (Weiner, 2013). 
Revenues are one of the important sources for a government to repay debts; an 
increase in government revenues helps the government to repay the existing sovereign 
loans. Theoretically, a higher debt-revenue ratio can increase the sovereign debt risk; 
this is supported by the results in the sovereign risk model (see Table 4.3). The 
debt-revenue ratio coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level and positively 
impacts the sovereign risk. 
 
Similarly, Manasse et al. (2003) studied sovereign debt crises based on a data set of 
47 countries from 1970 to 2002. The authors’ results show a positive impact of debt to 
revenue ratio on sovereign risk. The authors found that debt to revenue ratio is one of 
the important indicators in explaining sovereign debt crises. A higher debt-revenue 
ratio suggests a higher probability of a sovereign debt crisis occurring. Therefore, the 
authors believed that the debt affordability has a strong link to sovereign defaults. 
 
Holland, Kirby and Orazgani (2011) investigated the sovereign default and modelled 
the debt crisis in Europe. The authors found that sovereign defaults occur with the 
large imbalance between sovereign debt burden and government revenues. The 
imbalance between sovereign debts and government revenues represents an increasing 
debt to revenue ratio, which decreases debt affordability and increases the sovereign 
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risk. This supports the sovereign risk model’s results (see Table 4.3) where the 
increase in debt-revenue ratio raises the sovereign risk of a country. Cantor and 
Packer (1996) also confirmed this dramatic impact of the debt-revenue ratio on 
sovereign risk. Cantor and Packer argue that the increase in government revenues 
increases the ability of a government to repay debts, which positively impacts the 
stability of a country’s economy. This is attributed to a better sovereign rating. 
 
4.3.3 Debt Burden 
 
The World Bank and the IMF introduced a debt sustainability framework (DSF) in 
2005 and reviewed it in 2012. Both the World Bank and the IMF believe the debt 
burden (debt-GDP ratio) is an important determinant of the sovereign risk. The DSF 
focuses on the present value of total government debts and sets up debt burden 
thresholds to warn governments when the total sovereign debt burden exceeds the 
threshold value. Under the DSF, the threshold of the high-risk debt burden is 50%, 
which implies that once the government debt to GDP ratio is over 50%, sovereign 
defaults may take place relatively easily. 
 
The results in the sovereign risk model show a positive and significant (at the 1% 
level) relationship between debt-GDP ratio and sovereign risk. This suggests an 
extremely strong link between the debt burden and the sovereign risk. An increase in 
the sovereign debt burden (debt-GDP ratio) can increase the sovereign risk in China. 
Eichengreen and Mody (1999) tested the debt sustainability in East Asian countries 
during the period from 1991 to 1997 using macroeconomic fundamental variables 
 90 
 
such as debt-GDP ratio, debt-export ratio, and economic growth. The authors 
confirmed that the sovereign debt condition is strongly impacted by the debt-GDP 
ratio. Further, Yue (2010) studied the sovereign default and the debt renegotiation for 
emerging economies including Argentina and adopted the external debt to GDP ratio, 
debt service to GDP ratio, and interest rate to test how debt burden and debt interest 
rate impact on sovereign risk. The author pointed out that the increase in the interest 
rate raises the cost for the government to borrow new debts; consequently, a sovereign 
default might occur due to the extremely high credit price. Moreover, the author 
observed that the interest rate tends to increase with the level of debts. This may 
explain the strong link between the debt burden and the sovereign risk in the results in 
the sovereign risk model. 
 
4.3.3 Debt Rate 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, an increase in the interest rate raises the debt cost and 
further impacts the sovereign debt risk. In the sovereign risk model (equation 3.5), the 
debt interest rate positively and significantly impacts the sovereign debt risk at the 1% 
level. 
 
Generally, sovereign debts include fixed rate bonds and floating rate loans. Fixed rate 
bonds are bonds issued by the government to the public at a fixed rate, while floating 
rate loans are the government borrowing from the open market at a floating rate 
influenced by the market debt rate (Moorad, 2010). Changes in the debt interest rate 
dramatically impact existing government loans with a floating rate. An increase in the 
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debt interest rate significantly increases the loan interest, which increases loan 
repayments, which can negatively affect the sovereign risk (Yue, 2010). Although the 
interest rate of fixed rate bonds does not change over time, it can be impacted by the 
debt interest rate. When the debt interest rate increases, creditors tend to sell tradeable 
bonds to raise money and lend to the open market for a higher return (Moorad, 2010). 
As a result, the bonds value may decrease if the debt interest rate increases. According 
to Yue (2010), an increase in the debt interest rate raises the cost for the government 
to borrow new debts, thus a sovereign default may occur when the borrowing cost is 
extremely high. This is because governments may not be able to roll-over sovereign 
debts under a high debt interest rate, which creates a huge pressure on debt 
repayments. When the government deficit is inadequate to repay sovereign debts on 
maturity, defaults could occur (Yue, 2010). Yue treats the sovereign default as one of 
the rational options for the government. A higher debt interest rate significantly 
increases the sovereign debt price. When the debt price exceeds a critical level, the 
cost of repaying sovereign debts may eventually be greater than the negative impact 
(i.e. loss in reputations) of sovereign defaults. Therefore, the governments are likely 
to default on their sovereign debts. 
 
Similarly, Holland, Kirby and Orazgani (2011) confirmed the significant impact of the 
debt interest rate on the sovereign risk by studying the Eurozone countries’ interest 
liability burden. The authors found that the debt interest rate determines the sovereign 
debt burden; the imbalance of sovereign debt burden and government revenue is one 
of the important contributing factors of sovereign defaults. 
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4.3.4 Economic Growth 
 
Cantor and Packer (1996) believe that economic growth significantly impacts the 
sovereign risk. A relatively higher economic growth rate suggests that the government 
can serve the debt burden more easily over time, which causes economic growth to 
negatively impact the sovereign risk in China. In other words, the increase in 
economic growth will decrease the sovereign risk in a country. The results in the 
sovereign risk model show economic growth negatively impacts China’s sovereign 
debt risk at the 1% level of significance. The reason behind this is China’s high 
economic growth in the long-run. China experienced a high economic growth 
(average 9%) over the last three decades. The economic boom significantly increases 
China’s GDP, which in turn decreases the debt burden in China. Further, the economic 
boom can increase government revenue, which helps China’s government to repay 
sovereign debts. 
 
Pirtea et al. (2013) studied the sovereign debt of Romania from 2000 to 2011 and 
found that fiscal balance, interest rate, and GDP growth significantly impact the 
sovereign risk. The authors argued that the debt-GDP ratio captures the country’s debt 
burden; a higher debt burden increases the sovereign debt risk. An increase in 
economic growth increases the country’s GDP, which decreases the debt burden and 
increases government revenue. This helps the country to manage the sovereign debt 
risk. This result supports the findings of the sovereign risk model (equation 3.5) in our 
study results. 
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Cantor and Packer (1996) investigated the main factors that affect sovereign ratings 
based on cross-country data (from 49 countries and areas around the world) in 1995. 
The authors found that GDP growth is one of the six main factors that play important 
roles in determining sovereign ratings (the six factors include per capita income, GDP 
growth, inflation, debt level, economic development level and default history). GDP 
growth significantly impacts the sovereign risk, which supports our study results. 
Cantor and Packer argued that a relatively higher economic growth increases the 
future government revenue, which suggests an increase in the loan repayment ability. 
Thus, a higher GDP growth rate helps the government to serve sovereign loans over 
time. 
 
4.3.5 Inflation 
 
The sovereign risk model reveals the inflation coefficient is negative and significant at 
the 1% level. This suggests that the increase in inflation can decrease sovereign debt 
risk. The relationship between inflation and sovereign debt risk is supported by 
Cantor and Packer (1996) who tested the sovereign risk of 49 countries around the 
world in 1995.The authors argue that using tax revenues and issuing new debts are the 
two common methods to repay existing sovereign loans for the government. Owing to 
the potential negative impact of a high inflation on a country’s overall economy (Sarel, 
1996), an inflationary method (increase money supply – M2) will be used only when 
the government is unable to repay the loan using taxes or issuing new loans, which 
signals a potential sovereign debt problem in the country. Thus, Cantro and Packer 
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conclude that inflation has a significant impact on sovereign debt risk. 
 
Similarly, Fuertes and Kalotychou (2007) investigated the sovereign debt risk in 75 
emerging countries for the period 1983-2000. The authors reported strong impacts of 
government revenues, GDP growth, inflation, interest rate, and debt burden on debt 
instabilities. The authors argued that inflation, measured by the consumer price index 
(CPI), captures the country’s currency purchasing power and an increase in the CPI 
potentially devalues the country’s currency value. In other words, an increase in 
inflation decreases the currency’s purchasing power, which may devalue the country’s 
currency. The devaluation of the country’s currency increases the foreign exchange 
rate, which negatively impacts foreign debts. However, the increase in inflation 
decreases the real interest rate (interest rate - inflation), which positively impacts 
domestic debts. In China, domestic debt dominates total sovereign debt (see Table 
4.2), thus the negative impact of inflation on China’s foreign debt is extremely small 
compared to its impact on China’s domestic debt. As a result, inflation has a positive 
impact on China’s sovereign risk. 
 
Similarly, Sarel (1996) found a strong link between inflation and economic growth in 
the long run based on a global dataset in 87 countries during 1970-1990. The author 
states that a relatively low inflation rate (lower than 8%) positively impacts the 
country’s economic growth. The average CPI in our study was about 3%. Thus, 
inflation positively impacts the economic growth in China, which decreases China’s 
sovereign risk due to the decrease in the debt burden (debt-GDP ratio). However, this 
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impact is not effective for a higher inflation rate. When the country’s inflation is 
higher than 8%, the increase in inflation significantly decreases the country’s 
economic growth (Sarel, 1996). The high inflation decreases the return on capital, 
which in turn reduces the country’s investment; low investments can slow economic 
growth in the country (Kim, 1996). 
 
4.3.6 Sovereign Risk Model discussion 
 
The sovereign risk model of our study investigates the possibility of a debt crisis 
occurring in China. The sovereign risk of China is regressed based on macroeconomic 
fundamental variables such as debt affordability, debt burden, debt interest rate, 
economic growth, and inflation. The limit points of the ordered logistic model are 
787.5036 (limit_3) and 936.6469 (limit_4) (see Table 4.3). The limit points are used 
to divide the sovereign risk into three ordered risk level categories: 2 (less than 
limit_3), 3 (between limit_3 and limit_4), and 4 (larger than limit_4). The ordered risk 
level categories represent the ordered level of the sovereign risk in China, category 4> 
category 3> category 2. 
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Table 4.4 Estimated Sovereign Risk of China 
 Calculated value Estimated SR SR 1996 1095.333 4 4 
1997 1175.425 4 4 
1998 1158.818 4 4 
1999 975.6004 4 4 
2000 985.5003 4 4 
2001 982.4065 4 4 
2002 1017.526 4 4 
2003 1007.381 4 4 
2004 971.374 4 4 
2005 900.0939 3 3 
2006 902.0072 3 3 
2007 873.4322 3 3 
2008 823.6986 3 3 
2009 865.6146 3 3 
2010 722.9976 2 2 
2011 624.9911 2 2 
2012 733.1642 2 2 
2013 683.0401 2 2 
2014 595.0621 2 2 
Notice: SR represents China’s sovereign risk, which is measured by the Standard & 
Poor’s sovereign rating; Estimated SR estimates the sovereign risk of China based on 
the sovereign risk model’s results. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the estimated sovereign risk based on the sovereign risk model’s 
results (calculated by the independent variables and their coefficients). The similarity 
of the sovereign risk and the estimated sovereign risk captures how the estimated 
sovereign risk level, which is based on the macroeconomic fundamental variables, 
deviates from the actual sovereign risk level (Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating) in 
China during the study period from 1996 to 2014 (the estimated sovereign risk starts 
from 1996 due to the loss in the degree of freedom). The results in the sovereign risk 
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model (see Table 4.4) show similar sovereign risk level categories between the 
estimated sovereign risk and the actual Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating, which 
suggests the sovereign risk model performs well in measuring China’s sovereign risk. 
 
Further, the model estimates the sovereign risk in China in time T based on the 
independent variables at time T-1 (see Section 3.2.2). As a result, this model can be 
treated as an early warning system for China’s sovereign debt risk. According to 
Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005), an early warning system model (EWS model) is a 
model that both identifies the weakness of the economies and signals the onset of a 
financial crisis. For example, Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) introduced a 
currency crises EWS model based on the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 and Berg and 
Pattillo (1999) successfully used a currency and banking EWS model to predict the 
1997 Asian financial crisis (as cited in Berg, Borensztein, & Pattillo, 2005). 
Compared with EWS models in the currency and banking areas, the number of debt 
risk early warning system models is relatively small. This may due to the country 
heterogeneity that significantly impacts the debt risk EWS model’s performance in 
different countries. Further, there is no consensus agreement on the question of how 
dummy variables capture the country’s heterogeneity in cross-country data (Fuertes & 
Kalotychou, 2006). 
 
The sovereign risk model may be a suitable EWS model for a sovereign crisis for 
China. Based on macroeconomic fundamental variables (at time T), the sovereign risk 
model estimates the sovereign risk of China for the coming year (time T+1). This 
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provides the Chinese government with an overview of the sovereign risk condition for 
the coming year in which the Chinese government can make an early decision or 
preparation for a potential debt risk in China. The sovereign risk model (equation 3.5) 
potentially provides an opportunity for the Chinese government to manage the 
sovereign debt risk for the following year by implementing fiscal and monetary 
policies to influence the macroeconomic fundamental variables in the model. This 
provides a potential mechanism for the Chinese government to manage the sovereign 
risk in the future. 
 
Further, one of the objectives of the present study is to provide policy implications to 
avert a potential debt crisis in China. The sovereign risk model not only provides a 
prediction of the sovereign debt risk in China, but also investigates how 
macroeconomic fundamental variables impact on the sovereign debt risk in China. 
Based on the results in the sovereign risk model, debt affordability (debt-revenue 
ratio), debt burden (debt-GDP ratio), and debt interest rate positively impact the 
sovereign debt risk in China, while economic growth and inflation negatively impact 
China’s sovereign debt risk. However, using economic growth and inflation to adjust 
China’s sovereign risk is difficult; because it is difficult to increase economic growth 
and a high inflation (over 8%) harms the country’s economy (Sarel, 1996). Therefore, 
the options left for the Chinese government to manage the sovereign risk are to 
control the debt affordability and debt burden. Debt-GDP ratio and debt-revenue ratio 
positively impact the sovereign debt risk in China based on the results in the 
sovereign risk model. This suggests that an increase in government revenues and a 
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decrease in sovereign debts can help to decrease the sovereign debt risk in China. 
 
4.4 Results of the Bank Risk Model 
 
The present study also investigates how sovereign risk impacts bank risk in China 
based on a bank risk model (equation 3.6). The model captures bank risk affected by 
macroeconomic fundamental variables such as country characteristics (economic 
growth, inflation, sovereign risk and government debt interest rate) and bank 
characteristics (non-performing loan rate, profit per share, capital adequacy ratio and 
bank ownership). The bank risk model in the present study tests how the sovereign 
debt risk impacts bank risk in China (including state-owned banks and corporate 
banks). The estimated results of the bank risk model are presented in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 Results of the Bank Risk Model 
Variable Coefficient Estimates 
Sovereign risk 0.690*** 
(5.000) 
Economic growth 11.945*** 
(2.624) 
Inflation -0.142*** 
(-3.662) 
Debt interest rate 0.579*** 
(4.041) 
Profit per share 0.032 
(0.241) 
Non-performing loan rate -0.180*** 
(-3.761) 
Capital adequacy ratio 0.010 
(0.096) 
Bank ownership 0.316* 
(1.760) 
Year -0.036 
(-1.209) 
Number of observations 69 
LR statistic 23.71 
Prob (LR statistic) 0.005*** 
Notes: t-statistics is in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. F-statistic presents the joint significance of the bank 
risk model. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
4.4.1 Effects Specification 
 
The bank risk model (equation 3.6) is an unbalanced panel data model based on 8 
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selected banks (four large-sized state-owned banks and four small- and mid- sized 
corporate banks) in China from 2006 to 2014. Banks in China include state-owned 
banks and joint-equity corporate banks. The state-owned banks also called “the big 
four” are large sized banks; while joint-equity corporate banks are small- and mid- 
sized banks. The present study selects an equal amount of both state-owned banks and 
joint-equity corporate banks in order to avoid a potential bias issue due to the bank 
type. Based on the data availability, the data set for the bank risk model (equation 3.6) 
is an unbalanced panel data set. 
 
The unbalanced panel data can be balanced, but according to Kerstens and Woestyne 
(2014), balancing the unbalanced panel data can lose large amounts of information. 
The authors point out that due to the large information losses, the model results based 
on the balanced and the unbalanced panel data can be significantly different. Baltagi 
and Chang (1994) further explained that the more data losses in balancing an 
unbalanced panel date, the less efficient the model will be. The authors attempted to 
balance the unbalanced data from Harrison and Rubinfeld’s (1978) study(1) and 
concluded that balancing an unbalanced panel data shows a poor model performance 
and the performance becomes worse with the number of observations deleted (while 
balancing the panel data). If we balance the unbalanced panel data set of the bank risk 
model (equation 3.6) in our study, we will lose over 20% of the information. As a 
result, we use the unbalanced panel data in estimating the bank risk in China. 
 
For any regression, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are two major problems 
(1) Harrison and Rubinfeld’s (1978) study on the housing prices in Boston area in the 1970s using 
an unbalanced one-way model with period random effects 
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that need to be carefully dealt with. Our data set suffer from autocorrelation problem 
since it failed the Wooldridge test; thus, we estimate the generalised least square (GLS) 
regression model (bank risk model) by using Newey-West (HAC) method, which can 
eliminate both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the model. 
 
4.4.2 Bank Risk Measurement 
 
The dependent variable Z in the bank risk model (equation 3.6) is the Z-Score that 
captures bank risk such as bank performance, bank profitability, and bank volatility 
(Buch et al., 2013). The Z-score is a function of capital-asset ratio, return on assets 
and the standard deviation of assets return. Z-score is widely used to capture bank risk 
and Buch et al. (2013) tested how sovereign risk impacts on bank risk based on the 
quarterly German banks’ data from 2005 to 2010. The authors used the Z-score to 
measure bank risk and successfully capture the strong link between banks risk and 
sovereign risk. The sovereign risk of one country significantly impacts the value of 
the country’s debt, which affects the performance of banks that hold the country’s 
government bonds. Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga (2010) employed the 
Z-score to test the impact of the bank’s activity and the bank’s short-term funding 
strategy on bank risk. The authors state that the Z-score captures the probability of the 
bank’s insolvency, which is a key estimator for bank risk. Based on the definition of 
the Z-score (equation 3.7), the Z-score increases with higher capital adequacy 
(capital-asset ratio) or/and higher profitability (return on assets) or/and lower profit 
stability (assets return volatility) of banks. According to Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga 
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(2010), the Z-score is a measure of the bank’s solvency; a higher Z-score implies a 
lower probability of the bank’s insolvency. In other words, a higher Z-score represents 
lower bank risk in the bank risk model. 
 
4.4.3 Country Characteristics 
 
Country characteristics such as economic growth, sovereign risk, inflation and debt 
interest rate significantly impact bank risk in the bank risk model (see Table 4.5). 
Economic growth (GDP growth), sovereign risk, and debt interest rate positively 
impact bank risk (Z-score) in China, while inflation has a negative impact on bank 
risk in China. In this section, we will discuss the relationship between country 
characteristics and the Z-score. 
 
The increase in economic growth in China will increase the Z-score, in other words, 
decrease bank risk. The results in the bank risk model (see Table 4.5) show GDP 
growth has a positive impact on the Z-score (significant at the 1% level). A relatively 
higher economic growth rate potentially generates higher tax revenues, which 
suggests the government could serve the debt burden relatively more easily over time, 
thereby decreasing the sovereign debt risk. This may benefit banks because the 
decrease in the sovereign debt risk lowers the default risk of government loans that 
the banks hold. Levine and Zervos (1998) examined the long-run relations between 
economic growth, banks, and stock markets. The authors found that economic growth 
has a negative impact on bank risk. In addition, Levine (1998) confirmed this 
relationship between economic growth and bank risk. The author reports that 
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economic growth negatively impacts bank risk because economic growth is strongly 
linked to the bank performance. Levine argues that an economic boom helps to 
increase banks’ profitability and decrease banks’ non-performing loan rate, which 
significantly increases the banks’ performance. In addition, credit demands tend to 
increase during an economic boom period, which leads creditors (including banks) to 
implement a stricter credit rationing (Levine, 1998). This may lower the credit risk for 
banks. The above findings of Levine (1998) and Levine and Zervos (1998) support 
the results in our bank risk model (see Table 4.5) that the increase in GDP growth 
decreases bank risk in China. 
 
The impact of inflation on bank risk in China is negative (-0.142) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This implies that a 1% increase in inflation will decrease 
Z-score in China by 0.142%. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) tested bank risk 
and return based on 1334 banks in 101 countries. The authors found a strong 
relationship between bank risk and inflation because the inflation rate affects the bank 
performance and influences credit decisions of banks. Based on the authors’ argument, 
a higher inflation leads to a higher fee income ratio (the non-interest income over the 
total operating income) and a higher non-deposit fund ratio (the non-deposit fund over 
total deposits and the short-term funding) which negatively impact the bank’s stability. 
As a result, inflation may negatively impact bank risk which supports our results in 
the bank risk model (see Table 4.5). 
 
The government debt interest rate exhibits a positive impact on bank risk at the 1% 
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level of significance. The government debt interest rate captures the interest rate of 
debts (or the discount yield of government bonds). Higher debt interest rates increase 
the potential returns on debts that positively impact on bank profitability (assuming 
that debts will not default). Based on the Z-score definition (equation 3.7), bank 
profitability has a positive relationship with the Z-score. Thus, the results in the bank 
risk model show a positive impact of the debt interest rate on the Z-score. Similarly, 
Kohler (2012) tested bank risk by regressing the banks’ Z-score on 15 EU countries 
from 2002 to 2009 and found that the Z-score of banks is positively impacted by the 
debt interest rate. The author argues that the debt interest rate significantly impacts the 
bank’s interest income; a lower share of the non-interest income to the total bank 
income increases the bank’s stability, which decreases bank risk. 
 
The objective of the bank risk model (equation 3.6) is to test the impact of sovereign 
risk on bank risk in China. The estimated results (see Table 4.5) show a positive 
relationship between the Standard & Poor’s sovereign rating (the sovereign risk 
indicator) and the Z-score (significant at the 1% level). This implies that bank risk 
tends to be positively impacted by sovereign debt risk. One possible reason of the 
strong link between sovereign debt risk and bank risk is due to the impact of 
sovereign risk on the bank’s profitability. According to Gennaioli et al. (2014), 
investors tend to withdraw their credits when a sovereign debt problem occurs; this 
leads to panic sales in tradable government bonds, which decreases the market value 
of government bonds. Bank performance will be negatively impacted especially for 
banks that hold a large number of government bonds. As a result, the sovereign debt 
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risk significantly impacts the bank’s performance. For example, Blundell-Wignall and 
Slovik (2011) studied the 2010 European debt crisis and found that banks that held 
large numbers of sovereign debts of PIIGS countries experienced up to 50% haircuts 
on the sovereign debt assets value. The authors further reported that these banks’ 
performances were significantly impacted by the sovereign crisis in Europe. As a 
result, the authors concluded that the sovereign debt risk strongly impacted bank risk. 
Table 4.6 shows the information of Chinese government bonds held by selected 
commercial banks in 2015, which supports the positive link between sovereign debt 
risk and bank risk in China. In addition, Bernanke (1983) reported that sovereign 
defaults directly increase credit costs. Following this, medium/small size firms may 
go bankrupt, which in turn increases the non-performing loan rate of banks. This may 
lead to a bank crisis. These studies support the positive impact of sovereign risk on 
bank risk in our results (see Table 4.5). China’s sovereign risk decreased over the 
study period from 2006 to 2014 and bank risk in China also experienced a reduction 
during the same period. The decrease in both sovereign risk and bank risk in China 
may be partially due to the long-run relatively high economic growth in China (an 
average of 9% in GDP growth) (Das, Fiechter & Sun, 2013). In addition, the results in 
the bank risk model show a positive link between sovereign risk and bank risk; this 
positive impact contributes to the similar trends of the Z-score index and the Standard 
& Poor’s sovereign rating in China. 
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Table 4.6 Chinese Government Bonds Held by Selected Commercial Banks in 2015 
Selected commercial banks Chinese government bonds held in 2015 (billion RMB) 
Bank of China 1411.5 
China Construction Bank 1851.6 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 1468.7 
Agriculture Bank of China 1231.3 
State-owned commercial banks subtotal 5963.1 
China CITIC Bank 165.2 
China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd 439.1 
China Merchants Bank 171.1 
Industrial Bank Co., Ltd 421.5 
Joint-equity commercial banks subtotal 801.7 
Total 6764.8 
Source: Annual report of selected commercial banks, 2015 
 
4.4.4 Bank Characteristics 
 
Different banks may be impacted by sovereign risk differently in terms of the bank’s 
characteristics. The bank characteristics include non-performing loan rate, profit per 
share, capital adequacy ratio and bank ownership dummy. 
 
The profit per share captures the profitability of banks which positively impacts the 
Z-score. According to Kohler (2012), bank profitability is one of the determinants of 
bank risk because higher profitability generates higher returns that increase the ability 
of banks to deal with sudden shocks. Similarly, the capital adequacy ratio has a 
positive impact on the Z-score. This is attributed to a higher bank capital share to the 
total risk-weighted asset, which increases the banks’ stability (Kohler, 2012). Both the 
profit per share and capital adequacy ratios increased from 2006 to 2014 for selected 
banks of China, which potentially contributed to the increase in the Z-score index of 
Chinese banks. The present study observes an increasing Z-score of China’s banks 
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from 2006 to 2014; the average annual Z-score increase rate is about 3.68% in China. 
This suggests bank risk decreased in China during the period from 2006-2014. 
 
However, the results in the bank risk model show the coefficients of profit per share 
and capital adequacy ratio are insignificant. This is because of China’s high economic 
growth in the long run (averaging over 10% per year since the 1980s) and the bank 
bailout policy of the Chinese government. Firstly, the long-run high economic growth 
in China may create a positive economic environment expectation that the economic 
boom in China will not slow down in the future. This may encourage banks to ignore 
the risk. Mendoza and Terrones (2008) explained that the credit expansion is 
associated with economic booms. During the credit expansion period, banks tend to 
over lend and ignore risks of loans. Secondly, based on the old deposit insurance 
policy of China, no banks were allowed to go bankrupt in China before 1st of May, 
2015 (Chinese Government document number [660], 2015). To ensure banks have 
enough credits to avoid a bank failure, the old deposit insurance policy stipulates that 
the People’s Bank of China has the responsibility to bail out any large losses suffered 
by Chinese banks. This leads to moral hazard behaviour, which further encourages 
Chinese banks to take larger risks. Both of these factors may impact Chinese banks 
and contribute to the insensitivity of the bank’s risk-taking in China. Profit per share 
measures the profitability of banks and capital adequacy ratio captures the stability of 
banks, which are two important bank risk measurements (Cheng, Zhao & Zhang, 
2013). The insensitivity of the risk-taking in China’s banks potentially explains the 
insignificant impacts of profit per share and capital adequacy ratio on bank risk in the 
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bank risk model (see Table 4.5). 
 
The non-performing loan rate (dead loan rate) coefficient shows a negative impact on 
the Z-score at the 1% significance level in the bank risk model (see Table 4.5). This 
suggests that bank risk increases with the increase in non-performing loan rate. The 
coefficient of the non-performing loan rate is -0.180, which implies that the Z-score 
will decrease by 0.18% when the non-performing loan rate increases by 1%. Li et al., 
(2009) investigated non-performing loans and bank efficiencies in 40 Taiwanese 
commercial banks from 1996 to 2007. The authors found that the non-performing 
loan rate significantly impacted bank risk in terms of the decrease in bank efficiency 
and bank profit. The author reported that a higher non-performing loan rate reduces 
the banks’ aspiration to issue new loans, which directly decreases bank profit. The 
present study observes a decreasing non-performing loan rate in selected Chinese 
banks from 2006 to 2014. The decrease in the non-performing loan rate is attributed 
to the stable economic environment and the long-run high economic growth of China 
(Li & Carmen, 2013). Based on the regression results in the bank risk model (see 
Table 4.5), the decrease in Chinese banks’ non-performing loan rate will significantly 
increase the Z-score of Chinese banks, which decreases bank risk in China. According 
to Cheng, Zhao and Zhang (2013), the non-performing loan rate, profit per share, and 
capital adequacy ratio are three common indicators which impact bank risk. Among 
the three indicators, we observe that the non-performing loan rate is the only 
significant indicator in the bank risk model. A possible reason is the impact of the 
non-performing loan rate on the banks’ lending behaviour. Alhassan, Brobbey and 
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Asamoah (2013) studied the banks’ lending behaviour in Ghana from 2005 to 2010 
and found that bank lending behaviour mainly depends on the non-performing loan 
rate level. The authors argue that different non-performing loan rate levels among the 
loan sectors such as the housing loan sector, government loan sector, corporate loan 
sector, etc significantly impact bank decisions on the credit allocation, which in turn 
impacts bank profit. 
 
The bank ownership in our bank risk model is a dummy variable that captures 
state-owned banks. Banks in China are separated into two different types: government 
owned banks (large size banks) and joint-equity corporate banks (medium-small size 
banks). Bank ownership significantly impacts bank risk in China at the 10% 
significance level. The coefficient of the bank ownership dummy is 0.316, which 
implies that state-owned banks have a relatively lower risk than joint-equity corporate 
banks in China in spite of other factors. Bonin et al. (2005) tested bank performance 
and efficiency from 1996 to 2000 for 225 banks in transition countries. The authors 
confirm that the government ownership is one of the determinants of bank 
performance and has a significant impact on bank risk. This significant impact of the 
government ownership on bank risk could be attributed to the higher return on 
investments for state-owned banks in China. Many government dominated investment 
projects with potentially higher returns (such as high rate government bonds and 
infrastructure industries, including power, water, electricity, high-speed railway) are 
only open to state-owned banks in China, which may cause such banks to perform 
better than joint-equity corporate banks. Similarly, Bonin et al. (2005) investigated 
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bank performance and efficiency in 225 banks of transition countries from 1996 to 
2000 and found that the return on equity of government-owned banks was 
significantly higher than that of joint-equity corporate banks. Further, state-owned 
banks may be bailed out by the Chinese government for potentially large losses 
because of the government ownership and too big to fail policy; however, joint-equity 
corporate banks may receive no or minimal help from the government. 
 
4.4.5 Bank Risk Model Discussion 
 
One of the objectives of this study is to investigate the relationship between bank risk 
and sovereign risk in China. In other words, how does sovereign risk impact bank risk 
in China? The bank risk model captures China’s bank risk affected by macroeconomic 
fundamental variables such as country characteristics (economic growth, inflation, 
sovereign risk and debt interest rate) and bank characteristics (non-performing loan 
rate, profit per share, capital adequacy ratio and bank ownership). 
 
The result of the bank risk model confirms a strong positive relationship between 
sovereign risk and bank risk in China. Banks selected in our study include the four big 
state-owned banks (Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China and Agriculture Bank of China) and four small-medium 
sized joint-equity corporate banks (China CITIC Bank, China Everbright Bank, China 
Merchants Bank and Industrial Bank Co., Ltd). Further, the results in the bank risk 
model also confirm that bank ownership has a significant impact on how sovereign 
risk affects bank risk. 
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Figure 4.2 Bank Risk and Sovereign Risk of China 2006-2014 
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Figure 4.2 shows the difference between the sovereign risk index and the bank risk 
index in China. The first four figures refer to Chinese state-owned banks and the other 
four figures refer to joint-equity corporate banks of China. Clearly, the bank risk index 
and the sovereign risk index move in a similar trend for all selected banks; however, 
the similarity of the fluctuation between the sovereign risk index and the joint-equity 
corporate bank risk index in China is lower. This is attributed to the significant impact 
of the bank ownership in China where state-owned banks are more closely linked to 
the Chinese government due to many higher return investments (such as high rate 
government bonds) available only to state-owned banks in China (John, 2011). More 
importantly, under the current policy, state-owned banks in China will not be 
insolvent and larger losses of Chinese state-owned banks will be bailed out by the 
People’s Bank of China (Chinese government document [660], 2015), whereby only 
joint-equity corporate banks can go bankrupt. This suggests that joint-equity corporate 
banks in China may not receive such help (bailouts and security from being insolvent) 
from the government (Bonin et al., 2005). This potentially can partially transfer the 
bank risk of state-owned banks to the Chinese government, which contributes to the 
stronger link between sovereign risk and bank risk of state-owned banks compared 
with that of joint-equity commercial banks in China. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents the estimated results of three models: the debt dynamics model, 
the sovereign risk model and the bank risk model. The debt dynamics model (equation 
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3.2) tests sovereign debt changes in China. The estimated results of the debt dynamics 
model show the sovereign debt in China is mainly impacted by domestic debts, 
government expenditures, and economic growth. Domestic debts occupy more than 
98% of total sovereign debts in China, which contributes to the insignificant impact of 
external debts on China’s sovereign debt dynamics. Government revenue has marginal 
effects on China’s sovereign debt changes due to the long-run high GDP growth in 
China, which generates increasing tax revenues in the future. The sovereign risk 
model (equation 3.5) investigates what and how factors impact China’s sovereign debt 
risk. Debt affordability, debt burden, debt interest rate, economic growth and inflation 
are estimated to have significant impacts on the sovereign debt risk. The model is an 
ordered logistic model, which can be used as an early warning system for the 
sovereign risk in China (the dependent variable falls into a higher category which 
suggests a higher sovereign risk in China). The bank risk model (equation 3.6) tests 
how bank risk is affected by the sovereign debt risk in China. Based on the estimated 
results in the bank risk model, macroeconomic fundamental variables such as country 
characteristics (economic growth, inflation, sovereign risk and government debt yield) 
and bank characteristics (non-performing loan rate and bank ownership) statistically 
impact bank risk in China. The model successfully captured the strong positive link 
between sovereign debt risk and bank risk in China. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
5.1Introduction 
 
Chapter five summarizes the results and findings of the study. Section 5.2 presents an 
overview of the study. Section 5.3 describes the results of study objectives. Section 
5.4 presents the policy implications of the study. Limitations of the study are 
discussed in Section 5.5 and recommendations for future researches are provided in 
Section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes the study. 
 
5.2Overview of the Study 
 
The sovereign risk has increased the attention of economists in recent years, 
especially the EU debt crisis in 2009. The sovereign debt problem first broke out in 
Greece in 2009 and quickly spread to PIIGS countries, which fuelled the recent 
European debt crisis. The 2009 EU debt crisis contagiously harmed the financial 
system and the overall economy of the entire Eurozone. For example, three bailout 
packages (in 2010, 2012, and 2015, respectively) have been made to deal with the 
sovereign debt problem in Greece and the total bailout amount from the European 
Union to Greece was USD321 billion during 2010-2015. The IMF also participated in 
the first two bailouts in 2010 and 2012 and paid an additional USD49 billion to help 
the Greek debt problem. 
 
An outbreak of the sovereign debt problem may significantly impact other financial 
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sectors, especially the bank sector through spillover effects. This happens when banks 
hold a significant amount of government debts, which negatively impacts the 
collateral value of government loans (De Bruyckere, Gerhardt,  Schepens & Vennet, 
2012). Evidence can be found in the current Eurozone debt crisis. According to 
Angeloni and Wolff (2012), banks’ stock prices are strongly linked to the sovereign 
debt holdings of PIIGS countries following the outbreak of the European debt crisis. A 
negative shock in one market (sovereign debt issues in PIIGS countries) can directly 
impact the collateral values and cash flows associated with securities in the bank 
sector (banks that hold large amounts of government debts of PIIGS countries) 
(Kaminsky, Reinhart & Vegh, 2003). This significant impact of sovereign debt 
defaults on banks suggests that a sovereign debt crisis can easily lead to a bank crisis 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). 
 
In general, the sovereign debt burden (debt-GDP ratio), sovereign debt affordability 
(debt-revenue ratio), sovereign debt interest rate, external government debt maturity, 
economic growth (GDP growth), and inflation are believed to have significant impacts 
on sovereign debt risk. Most of the studies on sovereign debt issues focused on the 
impact of external debts and external debt-GDP ratio on sovereign debt risk (Krueger, 
1987; Euromoney, 1992; Kaminsky & Pereira, 1996; Boonman et al., 2013; Reinhart 
& Rogoff, 2010). However, other macroeconomic fundamentals also play important 
roles in determining sovereign debt risk. For example, the external government debt 
maturity length is introduced to explain why Mexico defaulted on its sovereign debts 
with a relatively low sovereign debt burden (20.2%) in 1994; a longer maturity length 
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helps to hedge the economic uncertainty risk (Cole & Kehoe, 1996; Eichengreen & 
Mody, 1999; Arteta & Hale, 2008; Desgranges & Rochon, 2014). In addition, 
government debt interest rate determines the price of sovereign debts, which 
significantly impacts sovereign debt risk (Yue, 2010). Holland, Kirby and Orazgani 
(2011) found the imbalance between sovereign debts and government revenues 
significantly contributes to sovereign debt defaults. GDP growth decreases the 
sovereign debt burden and increases tax revenues in the future, which helps the 
government to repay sovereign debts (Cantor & Packer, 1996; Fuertes & Kalotychou, 
2007). Inflation captures the increase in overall prices, which generates pressures on 
foreign exchange rate through the change in currency purchasing power. This may 
negatively impact the external sovereign debts of a country, which affects the 
sovereign debt risk (Cantor & Packer, 1996; Fuertes & Kalotychou, 2007; Thornton & 
Vasilakis, 2016). 
 
In regard to China’s sovereign debt condition, China experienced an increase in 
sovereign debts during the study period of 1995-2014; the annual increase in the rate 
of sovereign debts in China was 20%. Following the implementation of an economic 
stimulus program in 2008, the speed of increase in China’s sovereign debts was 
extremely high; China’s government debts at the end of 2015 were approximately 
three times higher than those of 2006 (see Table 1.2). The dramatic increase in 
sovereign debts fuelled the high debt burden of the Chinese government, which 
potentially increases the sovereign debt risk in China (Hinds, 2013). However, there is 
limited literature on the sovereign debt risk in China (Hou, Li, Li, & Mao, 2012; Fan 
 118 
 
& Lv, 2012; Li, 2012). The existing literature only focuses on the relatively large 
increase in macroeconomic indicators, such as the huge increase in Chinese 
government spending (Hou et al., 2012) and the increasingly large amount of central 
and local government loans (Fan & Lv, 2012; Li, 2012) since 2008, without providing 
any statistical tests on the long-run relationship between sovereign risk and 
macroeconomic fundamentals in China. To gain a better understanding of the 
sovereign risk and its impacts in China, the current study attempts to investigate 
sovereign debts, sovereign debt risk, and the spillover effect of the sovereign debt risk 
on bank risk in China by using the debt dynamics model, the sovereign risk model and 
the bank risk model, respectively. 
 
There are four research objectives in this study. Research objective one investigates 
whether a sovereign debt problem existed in China over the sample period of 
1995-2014, using the debt dynamics model. Research objective two examines the 
determinants of China’s sovereign debt risk from 1995 to 2014 based on the sovereign 
risk model. Research objective three surveys the impact of sovereign risk on bank risk 
in China during 2006-2014, using the bank risk model. Research objective four 
provides policy implications for the Chinese government based on the empirical 
results. These will be discussed in Section 5.4. 
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5.3 Research Results 
5.3.1 Results of Research Objective One 
 
 Research Objective One: To investigate whether a sovereign debt problem is 
occurring in China 
 
A debt surge in a short period suggests the existence of a sovereign debt problem 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). Since 2008, Chinese sovereign debts have increased over 
300%, which may create a sovereign debt problem. The significant increase in 
China’s government debts may be due to macroeconomic fundamentals: such as 
government expenditures, economic growth, and domestic debt interest rate. The 
results in the debt dynamics model (equation 3.2) show existing domestic debts, 
government expenditures, economic growth, and domestic debt interest rate have 
significant impacts on the sovereign debt of China. The existing domestic debts and 
domestic debt interest rate negatively impact China’s sovereign debt, while economic 
growth and government expenditures have positive impacts on the sovereign debts of 
China. The negative impact of the existing domestic debts and domestic debt interest 
rate is due to the Chinese government potentially decreasing its borrowing of new 
debts under a relatively high debt burden and high borrowing cost. Economic growth 
directly increases the loan repayment ability of the Chinese government, which has a 
positive impact on sovereign debts. The increase in government expenditures requires 
higher revenues to pay and when expenditures exceed revenues, the Chinese 
government has to issue sovereign debts. This explains the positive impact of 
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government expenditures on the sovereign debts of China. 
 
This study used the debt dynamics model to capture the equilibrium sovereign debt 
dynamics of China in the long run. The large gap between the sovereign debt in China 
and its equilibrium value suggests a sovereign debt problem exists in China. 
Consistent with some researches in China (Hou et al., 2012; Fan & Lv, 2012; Li, 
2012), the debt dynamics model results suggest the existence of a sovereign debt 
problem in China since 2009. For example, Figure 4.1 shows the significant increase 
in the sovereign debt of China that far exceeded its fundamentally based equilibrium 
value during the period from 2009 to 2012. The reasons include: 
 
1. The 2008 global financial crisis negatively impacted the economic growth in 
China; China’s GDP growth rate has decreased by 7.3% (from 14.2% in 2007 to 
6.9% in 2015) since 2008. The decrease in GDP growth negatively impacts 
revenues of the Chinese government, which decreases the ability of the 
government to repay its sovereign debts. This has significantly impacted the 
sovereign debt burden in China. 
2. The economic stimulus program, which was implemented by the Chinese 
government in 2008, dramatically increased government expenditures in China. 
The large increase in government expenditures potentially increases the 
imbalance of the government budget (government expenditures exceed revenues), 
which significantly increases the sovereign debt in China. For example, Table 1.2 
(see Section 1.2) showed that China’s sovereign debts increased by approximately 
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200% from 2009 to 2015. 
3. The domestic debt interest rate experienced a consistent decrease during the study 
period of 1995-2014. The decrease in the domestic debt interest rate decreased 
the credit price for the Chinese government to borrow from the open market. The 
decrease in credit price encouraged the Chinese government to borrow at a 
relatively low cost, which contributed to the increase in sovereign debts of China. 
4. More importantly, the Chinese government spent extensively from the 2008 
economic stimulus package on major infrastructures, such as high-speed 
transportation and electricity (37% of the total spending), the 2008 Wenchuang 
earthquake rebuild (25%), low-rent housing development (10%) and rural areas’ 
infrastructure including road, gas and clean water facilities (10%), etc. However, 
these massive investments generated significantly low returns to meet the 
requirement of sovereign debt repayments (Li, 2013), which decreased the ability 
of the Chinese government to repay debts. This contributed to the increase in the 
debt burden of the Chinese government. 
 
5.3.2 Results of Research Objective Two 
 
 Research Objective Two: To examine how macroeconomic fundamentals impact 
China’s sovereign debt risk 
 
This study adopted the sovereign risk model (equation 3.5) to test the sovereign debt 
risk and predict a potential sovereign debt crisis in China. The sovereign risk model is 
an ordered logistic model, which measures ordered sovereign risk levels in China. The 
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results in the sovereign risk model suggest the sovereign debt risk in China is 
determined by macroeconomic fundamentals, such as: 
 
1. Government revenues are an important source for the government to repay debts. 
The increase in government revenues increases the ability of the government to 
repay sovereign debts. Thus, government revenues are pledged to sovereign debt 
repayments (Weiner, 2013) and higher government revenues help the Chinese 
government to repay debts. Thus, the debt-revenue ratio negatively impacts 
sovereign risk in China. 
2. A high level of debt burden suggests unsustainable sovereign debt in the country 
(Eichengreen & Mody, 1999; Yue, 2010). The increase in the debt burden requires 
a higher government budget to repay, but once the debt burden exceeds a critical 
level, the government is unable to repay debts and their interest, resulting in a 
sovereign default. Thus the increase in debt burden increases sovereign risk. The 
debt-GDP ratio measures the debt burden in China, which has a negative impact 
on China’s sovereign risk. 
3. The interest rate of sovereign debts determines the debt price; sovereign defaults 
may transpire when it is extremely expensive for governments to roll-over the 
existing debts (Moorad, 2010; Yue, 2010; Holland, Kirby & Orazgani, 2011). An 
increase in interest rate directly increases the cost to borrow new debts for the 
Chinese government, which potentially lead to an inability to roll-over the 
existing debts when the borrowing cost is extremely expensive. Under this 
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circumstance, a sovereign default could easily appear in China. Thus, the increase 
in interest rate can significantly increase China’s sovereign risk. 
4. Economic growth potentially decreases the debt-GDP ratio and increases the 
future government revenue (Pirtea et al., 2013; Cantor & Packer, 1996). A 
relatively high economic growth in the long run (an average of 9% over the last 
30 years) positively impacts the debt burden and government revenue in China, 
which in turn helps to manage China’s sovereign debt. 
5. Most of the literature studies the impact of inflation on sovereign risk in a foreign 
debt context (Cantor & Packer, 1996; Fuertres & Kalotychou, 2007). However, 
domestic debt dominates sovereign debt in China (approximately 99% over the 
study period from 1995 to 2015) and foreign debt has been extremely small in 
proportion to the total debts of China; thus, foreign debt has an extremely low 
effect on sovereign risk in China. Under this circumstance, the impact of inflation 
on the sovereign risk of China depends on its impact on domestic debts. Inflation 
can decrease the credit price (the cost for the Chinese government to repay debts) 
by influencing the real interest rate (interest rate – inflation), which in turn 
decreases the domestic sovereign debt risk in China. 
 
More importantly, the land remising fee plays an important role in China’s 
government revenues and indirectly impacts the sovereign debt risk in China. 
Approximately 30% of the government revenues and funds in China were from land 
remising fees in 2015. The land remising fee can significantly impact the government 
revenue in China, which in turn affects China’s sovereign debt risk. This is highly 
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related to the housing market in China as the Chinese government sells the right to use 
the land through auctions and the land remising fee is the price that housing 
developers pay to use the land. Housing prices can significantly impact the 
willingness to pay of the housing developers. During a boom time, housing 
developers are willing to pay higher land remising fees because the increase in 
housing prices increases the profit margin. On the other hand, a decrease in housing 
prices can easily lead to a decrease in the land remising fee, which in turn decreases 
the revenues of the Chinese government. Thus, there is a potentially strong link 
between the housing market and sovereign debt risk in China. 
 
5.3.3 Results of Research Objective Three 
 
 Research Objective Three: To study the link between bank risk and sovereign 
debt risk in China’s financial market 
 
An outbreak of a sovereign debt crisis suggests a crash in the country’s credit market. 
This significantly increases the banks’ non-performing loan rates, which may lead to a 
potential bank crisis (Bernanke, 1983; Arteta & Hale, 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). 
This study employed the bank risk model (equation 3.6) to test the determinants of 
bank risk and to investigate how sovereign risk impacts bank risk in China. The 
findings of the bank risk model are: 
 
1. Overall macroeconomic conditions significantly impact bank risk in China. 
Economic growth and debt interest rate positively impact bank risk in China, 
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where inflation has a negative impact on China’s bank risk. 
2. Non-performing loan rates negatively affect bank risk in China. This is due to the 
non-performing loan rates not only decreasing the banks’ performance but also 
determining the banks’ credit allocation (Li et al., 2009; Li & Carmen, 2013; 
Cheng, Zhao & Zhang, 2013; Alhassan et al., 2013). The non-performing loan 
rate of China’s banks decreased significantly during the period 2006-2014, 
especially for state-owned banks due to the economic boom and the 
debt-for-equity swap plan by the Chinese government. The debt-for-equity swap 
plan allows banks in China sell a large number of non-performing loans to the 
government, which significantly increases the banks’ profitability in China. 
3. Bank risk is significantly influenced by sovereign debt risk in China. The reason 
could be a sovereign debt problem exposure which not only leads to panic sales 
of government bonds, but may severely impact the country’s credit markets, 
which endangers the country’s banking system (Bernanke, 1983; Gennaioli et al., 
2014; Blundell-Wignall & Slovik, 2011). Banks in China hold a large number of 
Chinese government bonds; for example, approximately 70% of Chinese 
government bonds (valued over RMB5 trillion) were held by Chinese banks by 
the end of 2014. The influence of China’s sovereign debt risk significantly 
impacts the banking system of China. 
4. Bank ownership significantly impacts bank risk in China. In spite of other factors, 
state-owned banks exhibit relatively low bank risk in China due to many higher 
return investments available only to state-owned banks, which increases bank 
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performances for state-owned banks (John, 2011) and the bail-out policy for 
state-owned banks (Bonin et al., 2005) in China. 
 
5.4 Policy Implications 
 
An important objective of the current study is to provide policy implications to avoid 
a potential sovereign debt crisis and its impacts in China. Based on the empirical 
results and findings, this study provides policy implications for the Chinese 
government and banks to manage sovereign debt risk and its negative impacts 
discreetly. 
 
The current study observed an unexpected increase in China’s sovereign debts after 
2009 (see Figure 1), which is due to the implementation of the 2008 Chinese 
economic stimulus program that significantly increased government expenditures 
(Fan & Lv, 2012). The massive government spending significantly increased the debt 
burden of China and has formed a sovereign debt problem in China since 2009 (Li, 
2013). Thus, one of the suggestions of this study is that the Chinese government 
should start to decrease government expenditures in the budget. The large increase in 
government expenditures has increased the sovereign risk of China since 2009 and 
endangers the stability of the Chinese economy. The decrease in government 
expenditures may help to decrease the sovereign risk. 
 
Second, this study provided a potential early warning system (EWS) model in China 
for policy makers to manage China’s sovereign risk. The sovereign risk model 
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(equation 3.5) estimated the sovereign debt risk in China based on yearly time-series 
data. Macroeconomic fundamentals in the last time period (T-1): debt-GDP ratio, 
debt-revenue ratio, debt interest rate, economic growth, and inflation determine 
China’s sovereign risk in the current time period (T). Thus, the sovereign risk model 
can provide a sovereign debt risk prediction for the next year (period T+1), based on 
macroeconomic fundamentals in the current year (period T), to enable the Chinese 
government to make concerted decisions to control the sovereign debt risk in the 
future. 
 
The third policy implication of this study is that the Chinese government and banks 
should pay attention to the spillover effect between sovereign debt risk and bank risk. 
Sovereign debt risk significantly impacts bank risk in China and includes: 
 
1. Sovereign debt risk directly impacts the value of government loans held by banks 
in China. The outbreak of a sovereign debt problem significantly decreases the 
value of government loans, which in turn increases the risk of banks that hold 
government loans (Gennaioli et al., 2014). The banks of China hold a large 
number of Chinese government bonds (over RMB11 trillion), which is 
approximately 70% of the total Chinese government bonds. A potential outbreak 
of a sovereign debt problem in China can directly lead to large losses in the 
government bonds that banks’ hold, which significantly decreases bank 
performance. 
2. The sovereign debt risk indirectly impacts the banking system in China through 
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the impact on the credit markets. Sovereign defaults significantly increase the 
credit cost of the country; consequently, firms may have difficulties in repaying 
their debts, which in turn increases the non-performing loans of the banks 
(Bernanke, 1983). 
 
The impact of sovereign risk on government-owned banks is larger than that on 
joint-equity cooperate banks in China. The reason is due to the political interference 
in banks in China (Li et al., 2009). Government ownership significantly impacts the 
political interference in banks in China; for example, government-owned banks were 
observed to assume more sovereign loans in China (Xu, Gan & Hu, 2015). On the one 
hand, high rates of government bonds are only available to state-owned banks in 
China, which may contribute to the relatively high amounts of sovereign loan 
holdings. On the other hand, the Chinese government is able to influence the funding 
strategy of the state-owned banks based on its ownership, which can decrease the 
investment independence of banks (Thakrar, 2013). These contribute to the strong link 
between bank ownership and bank risk in China. 
 
Fourth, the housing market has a significant impact on sovereign debt risk in China 
due to its impact on the land remising fee. As discussed in Section 5.3.3, the land 
remising fee plays an important role in the government revenues in China and is an 
important collateral source of the Chinese government to borrow from banks. Thusthe 
land remising fee significantly impacts sovereign risk in China. However, it can be 
highly dependent on the willingness to pay of housing developers. During a boom 
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time, relatively high housing prices increase the demand for land, which in turn 
increases the land remising fee. On the other hand, the decrease in housing prices can 
easily lead to a crash in the land remising fee. Thus, the Chinese government should 
be careful about potential shocks in China’s housing market. The current study found 
a significant impact of government revenue on sovereign debt risk in China as China’s 
government revenue is significantly impacted by the land remising fee, which is 
determined by the demand for land. A negative shock in China’s housing market can 
negatively impact the housing demand, which in turn decreases the demand for land 
by developers. Thus, the stabilization of the housing market is essential for the 
Chinese government to manage China’s sovereign debt risk. 
 
5.5Research Contributions 
 
First, since the outbreak of the sovereign crisis in Europe, many researchers have paid 
attention to the government debt concerns in Europe and emphasized the strong link 
between debt burden/level and sovereign risk in a country. In the recent years, 
Chinese government held an increasingly high debt level which may potential 
generate a sovereign debt problem endangering China’s economy. However, there are 
limited international studies in the literature that focus on sovereign debt risk in China. 
In addition, the existing literature in sovereign debt problem of China only focused on 
the increasingly high debt level and debt burden without empirically investigating the 
impact of macroeconomic fundamentals on sovereign debt risk in China (see Hou et 
al., 2012; Fan & Lv, 2012 and Li, 2012). Hou et al (2012) focused on the imbalance 
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between the investment and consumption of China which suggest an unhealthy 
economic condition exists in China (see Section 2.6). Fan and Lv (2012) and Li (2012) 
discussed the increasingly large amounts of central and local government loans in 
China which far exceed the debt affordability of the Chinese government (see Section 
2.6).Thus, our study bridges this gap by providing an empirical study on potential 
sovereign debt problem in China. 
 
Second, as a widely used indicator of sovereign debt risk, S&P sovereign ratings are 
generally used to estimate foreign currency sovereign debt risk in the literature. 
However, limited studies have attempted to use S&P sovereign ratings to estimate 
sovereign debt risk in a country without any external sovereign debt problem. The 
results of sovereign risk model in our study showed significant impacts of 
macroeconomic fundamentals on sovereign debt risk in China, which suggests that 
S&P sovereign ratings may also be suitable in determining government domestic debt 
risk, i.e. China. 
 
Third, section 1.5 in Chapter One discussed the significant difference between China 
and other countries’ government bond market and banking system, suggesting the 
potential dramatic difference in the impact of sovereign debt risk on banking system. 
Thus, this study attempts to investigate the relationship between sovereign debt risks 
and banking system, especially for the difference between state-owned and 
non-state-owned commercial banks, in China. However, most existing studies 
investigate the sovereign debt risk in China individually. Therefore, our study 
 131 
 
investigates the interactions between sovereign debts and other sectors such as banks 
and housing markets. Our results exhibit a strong link between bank risk and 
sovereign debt risk in China; the housing market can significantly impact the 
sovereign debt risk in China. The link between bank risk and sovereign debt risk in 
China shows the strong impact of sovereign risk on the banking system of China, 
especially for the state-owned banks; an outbreak of a sovereign debt problem can 
potentially crash the banking system in China. 
 
5.6 Research Limitations 
 
This study focuses on China’s sovereign debt issue at the country level. The study 
discussed the sovereign debt bubbles/risks of the Chinese central government and the 
results showed high central government debt to GDP ratios consistently, especially 
after the 2008 financial crisis. Further, the debt dynamics model (equation 3.2) 
detected a large gap between total sovereign debts and the equilibrium sovereign 
debts of the Chinese central government, which suggests a sovereign debt problem 
exists in China. However, there are 31 provinces/regions in China, thus the sovereign 
debt situation and risk may be different among the provinces. Thus, testing the 
sovereign debt risk for each province in China can better our understanding of the 
sovereign risk at the local government level. However, owing to time constraints and 
data limitations (local governments’ debts data are unavailable for many provinces), 
the investigation of sovereign debt risk at the region/province level and the 
differences in local governments’ debt risk among 31 provinces are not included in 
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this study. As a result, our results only provide implications for the Chinese central 
government to manage sovereign risk in China at the country level; such implications 
may be not effective for each local government. 
 
Owing to the data availability, this study investigates the sovereign debt dynamics and 
risks based on 20 years observations. The definition of the long run in economics is 
critical. Parkin and Bade (2015) define the long run as a time period in which all the 
input can be varied; there is no certain length of time period to differentiate the long 
run and the short run. Compared with some researchers (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010; 
Fink & Scholl, 2016) who studied sovereign debt risks based on a data period over 40 
years in length, the data length of this study is 20 years which may not be adequate to 
capture the sovereign debt dynamics and risks in the long run in China. Further, many 
small-middle sized banks’ reports are not available to the public before 2006; 
therefore, this study only tests the relationship between sovereign debt risk and bank 
risk from 2006 to 2014. As a result, data length is a limitation of this study. 
 
5.7 Suggestions for Further Study 
 
We recommend future research in this topic should try to focus on the sovereign debt 
risk of China at both country level and region/province level. China’s economic 
stimulus package in 2008 required both central and local governments to spend large 
amounts of money and local governments undertook approximately 70% of payments 
(RMB2.82 trillion) (Fan & Lv, 2012). This increased local governments’ debt burden 
(Li, 2012), which potentially generated a local governments’ debt problem in China. 
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In addition, economic and government debts’ conditions in different provinces in 
China are significantly different. For example, the GDP of Guangdong province was 
more than 70 times higher than that of Tibet province in 2015 and the government 
debts of Jiangsu province were approximately 2 times higher than those of its 
neighbour, Anhui province. This suggests that local governments’ debt situations 
(debt-GDP ratio and debt-revenue ratio) can be extremely different among different 
provinces in China. For example, the debt-GDP ratio of Guizhou province was as high 
as around 90%, which was approximately 3 times higher than the average debt-GDP 
ratio among provinces in China. Thus, we suggest that further studies should try to 
test the sovereign debt risk at the local government level in China. However, data 
availability at the local governments’ level is poorly kept in China and the shadow 
bank is a serious challenge to calculate the total debt of local governments. 
 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was launched by China in late of 2013 
with the aim to invest in the infrastructure projects of developing countries. AIIB 
started to operate at the beginning of 2016 and budgeted to invest USD1.2 billion in 
2016. The purpose of AIIB is to develop Asia and increase regional economic growth. 
Until September 2016, AIIB has invested USD829 million in infrastructure programs 
in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Tajikistan, which benefited China 
by increasing the demand for building materials and design services from China. 
However, the impact of AIIB in the long run is uncertain. It is important to investigate 
the long run benefit of AIIB on China, which may help the Chinese government to 
avoid a potential sovereign debt problem. Thus, we recommend future research should 
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focus on the impact of AIIB on economic growth, government revenue, and the 
trade-off relationship of China and other Asian countries, which may significantly 
help the Chinese government to control the sovereign debt risk. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
A high debt burden and low debt affordability could potentially generate a sovereign 
debt problem. A default or rollover of sovereign debt could crash the economy of a 
country or even the whole region. The 1980s’ Latin American debt crisis and the 
recent Eurozone sovereign crisis are two clear examples. These two debt crises have 
documented the significant impact of sovereign defaults/rollovers on the regional 
economy at large. 
 
After the outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis, exports decreased dramatically 
in China which drove down the GDP growth of China by 7.3%, due to the relatively 
high export-GDP ratio of China (approximately 40% in 2008). China’s GDP growth 
rate decreased from 14.2% to 6.9% during the period 2008-2015. The Chinese 
government implemented a missive economic stimulus program to manage the 
negative impacts of the 2008 global financial crisis. These raised concerns about the 
Chinese sovereign debt risk and Hou et al (2012) suggest that the Chinese economic 
stimulus program, which required the Chinese government to invest RMB4 trillion 
during 2008-2010, contributed to the steady economic growth (approximately 10% 
during 2009-2010) in China. However, the imbalance between the investment and 
consumption of China suggests an unhealthy economic condition exists, which has 
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dramatically increased the Chinese sovereign debts since 2008. Fan and Lv (2012) 
further discuss that the increasing debt burden, which is due to the 2008 Chinese 
economic stimulus plan, potentially generates a sovereign debt problem in China. The 
outbreak of the sovereign debt problem can negatively impact the overall economy 
and financial system in China. 
 
Differently from previous studies, this study not only examined sovereign debt 
dynamics in China, but also tested the determinants of China’s sovereign risk and the 
impact of sovereign risk on bank risk in China. 
 
In conclusion, the 2008 Chinese economic stimulus program significantly increased 
the sovereign debts of China and has generated a large sovereign debt problem in 
China since 2009. Macroeconomic fundamentals (such as debt-GDP ratio, 
debt-revenue ratio, debt interest rate, economic growth, and inflation) are the main 
causes of China’s sovereign debt risk. The sovereign risk model (equation 3.5) tests 
the impacts of these macroeconomic fundamentals on sovereign risk in China and 
provides a mechanism for the Chinese government to manage the government debt 
risk by influencing such macroeconomic fundamentals. Further, the land remising fee 
(land prices) plays an important role in China’s revenue, which suggests a strong link 
between the housing market and sovereign debt risk in China. Through the spillover 
effect, the sovereign debt risk can be transferred to the banking sector in China, 
especially for state-owned banks. This indicates the necessity and essentiality for the 
Chinese government to control China’s sovereign debt risk. 
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The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was proposed by China and began 
operation in 2016. AIIB aims to invest in developing countries’ infrastructure projects 
(mainly in Asia) to improve the development of the Asian region. The investment of 
AIIB can create large demands for building materials and design services; for 
example, the Pakistan national motorway M-4 project, which is invested in by AIIB, 
is designed and partially constructed by a Chinese enterprise (China Railway First 
Group) (Work on Gojra-Shorkot motorway begins, 2016). This potentially benefits 
China’s economic growth and exports (Lin, 2016), thus the operating of AIIB may 
have significantly positive impacts on China’s economy. This will help mitigate any 
possible sovereign default risk in China. 
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Appendix A 
Table A Regression Results of the Debt Dynamics Model 
Dependent Variable: LOG(SD) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/09/15   Time: 15:22 
Sample (adjusted): 2 19 
Included observations: 18 after adjustments 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 10.09313 4.713261 2.141433 0.0646 
LOG(DD(-1)) -0.453572 0.153400 -2.956799 0.0182 
LOG(FD(-1)) 0.435566 0.654137 0.665863 0.5242 
LOG(E) 5.252541 1.115607 4.708235 0.0015 
LOG(R) 0.626758 1.826926 0.343067 0.7404 
EG 1.637737 0.687451 2.382334 0.0444 
DIR -11.15154 4.708040 -2.368617 0.0453 
FIR -0.118659 0.387175 -0.306475 0.7671 
LOG(IF) -1.665307 2.261009 -0.736532 0.4824 
EXL -2.48E-05 1.70E-05 -1.460663 0.1822 
 
R-squared 0.745897     Mean dependent var 0.163218 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460031     S.D. dependent var 0.217651 
S.E. of regression 0.159936     Akaike info criterion -0.527909 
Sum squared resid 0.204635     Schwarz criterion -0.033258 
Log likelihood 14.75118     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.459704 
F-statistic 2.609254     Durbin-Watson stat 2.113637 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.095766  
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Appendix B 
Table B Regression Results of the Sovereign Risk Model 
Dependent Variable: SR 
Method: ML - Ordered Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 07/22/15   Time: 13:27 
Sample: 1 19 
Included observations: 19 
Number of ordered indicator values: 3 
Convergence achieved after 53 iterations 
Coefficient covariance computed using the Huber-White method 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
DA 1.173650 0.429649 2.731650 0.0063 
DB 22.79635 6.260235 3.641453 0.0003 
DR 98.03222 4.759725 20.59619 0.0000 
EG -4.47E-05 1.39E-05 -3.225913 0.0013 
IF -15.87999 0.698289 -22.74127 0.0000 
 
Limit Points 
 
LIMIT_3:C(6) 787.5036 57.28111 13.74805 0.0000 
LIMIT_4:C(7) 936.6469 50.59509 18.51260 0.0000 
 
Pseudo R-squared 1.000000 Akaike info criterion 0.736842 
Schwarz criterion 1.084793 Log likelihood -2.00E-15 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.795729 Restr. log likelihood -20.07494 
LR statistic 40.14988 Avg. log likelihood -1.05E-16 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000000  
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Appendix C 
Table C Regression Results of the Bank Risk Model 
Dependent Variable: Z 
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects) 
Date: 10/12/15   Time: 12:53 
Sample: 2006 2014 
Periods included: 9 
Cross-sections included: 8 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 69 
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -58.56402 35.04145 -1.671278 0.0999 
EG 121.3874 65.22013 1.861195 0.0676 
SR 5.752173 2.017570 2.851039 0.0060 
IF -1.083824 0.635968 -1.704212 0.0935 
GDY 5.161521 2.474211 2.086128 0.0412 
PS 0.185673 0.674025 0.275469 0.7839 
DL -1.753590 0.549193 -3.193030 0.0022 
CAR 0.389506 0.966329 0.403078 0.6883 
DUMMY 2.525158 1.286899 1.962204 0.0544 
 
Effects Specification 
 S.D. Rho 
Period random 0.000000 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic random 4.407852 1.0000 
 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.250518     Mean dependent var 12.19644 
Adjusted R-squared 0.150588     S.D. dependent var 4.644373 
S.E. of regression 4.280420     Sum squared resid 1099.320 
F-statistic 2.506917     Durbin-Watson stat 0.304550 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.020235    
 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.250518     Mean dependent var 12.19644 
Sum squared resid 1099.320     Durbin-Watson stat 0.304550 
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Appendix D 
Using Yield Spreads as Sovereign Debt Risk Indicator in China 
 
Sovereign debt risk in a country cannot be observed directly; thus, estimators are 
needed to measure sovereign debt risk. Generally, there are two main indicators that 
are widely used to estimate sovereign debt risk in the literature: yield spreads and 
sovereign ratings (Maltritz et al., 2012 and Balima et al., 2017). Yield spreads are the 
yield difference from the secondary market between the sovereign bond yield in the 
target country and the yield of US bonds. Researchers, such as Arora and Cerisola 
(2001) and Rowland and Torres (2004), have used yield spreads to measure sovereign 
debt risk in their study. Sovereign ratings are long-term government debt ratings 
normally provided by three major agencies including S&P. Cantor and Packer (1996), 
Afonso (2002), Rowland and Torres (2004) and Chen, Chen, Chang and Yang (2013) 
employed S&P sovereign ratings as an indicator of sovereign debt risk. 
 
In the current study, we investigated sovereign debt risk in China; yield spreads and 
government bond yields are not suitable in studying our data set. The reasons,which 
include both the shortages of the indicator itself and unique sovereign debt condition 
in China referring to the differences in government bond market between China and 
other countries, are show as follow: 
 
1. Yield spreads capture the comparative sovereign debt risk of the target country 
based on the debt risk of the U.S./Germany government; both changes in Chinese 
sovereign debt risk and the U.S./Germany sovereign debt risk will impact the 
yield spreads. Therefore, using yield spreads to estimate sovereign debt risk has an 
assumption that the sovereign debt risk of the U.S./Germany government is 
constant, which is not the real case. 
2. Yield spreads data is collected from the secondary market, which includes both 
investors and speculators; moreover, the investors are general not rational in 
buying and selling. Thus, the yield spreads may not able to capture the true 
sovereign risk for a selected country. 
3. The most importantly, differ from many other countries; more than 65% of the 
Chinese sovereign debt is purchased by Chinese commercial banks especially 
state-owned commercial banks (data from AsiaBondsOnline, 2016). As a result, 
the strong political interference of Chinese government on state-owned 
commercial banks can significantly influence (decrease) the sovereign debt yield 
in China. 
 
In addition, using yield spreads and government bond yield as the sovereign debt risk 
indicator in the sovereign risk model showed poor results as follow: 
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Table D Results of using government bond 
yield as sovereign debt risk indicator 
 
Variables Coefficient 
Constant 0.584965 
Debt/revenue ratio 0.001462 
Debt/GDP ratio -0.024326 
Economic growth -0.155982** 
Inflation 0.052788 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses below the estimates. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. F-statistic presents the joint significance of 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Both yield spreads results and government bond yield results showed similar results 
of the sovereign risk model in the current study which uses S&P sovereign ratings as 
sovereign debt risk indicator in China. However, using government debt yield and 
yield spreads as sovereign debt risk indicator showed insignificant impact of many 
macroeconomic fundamentals. These suggest that bond yield and yield spreads may 
be inadequate in measuring sovereign debt risk in China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E Results of using yield spreads as 
sovereign debt risk indicator 
 
Variables Coefficient 
Constant 1.933444 
Debt/revenue ratio 0.030736 
Debt/GDP ratio 0.071870* 
Economic growth -0.411585*** 
Inflation -0.013489** 
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Appendix E 
Results of Bank Risk Model with a Selection of 17 Commercial Banks 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, there are two types of commercial banks operate 
nationally in China: 5 state-owned commercial banks (Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agriculture Bank of 
China and Bank of Communications) and 12 non-state-owned joint-equity 
commercial banks (China CITIC Bank, China Everbright Bank, China Merchants 
Bank, Industrial Bank Co., Ltd, Hua Xia Bank Co., Ltd, China Guangfa Bank, Ping 
An Bank Co., Ltd, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, China Minsheng Banking 
Crop., Ltd, Hengfeng Bank Co., Ltd, China Zheshang Bank Co., Ltd and China Bohai 
Bank Co., Ltd). 
 
Selecting all the 17 commercial banks and using market share and bank ownership 
variables to control the size and type of each bank is an alternative method to 
eliminate the bias impact of bank size and type on bank risk in China. Results are 
presented in the follow table: 
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Table F Results of Bank Risk Model (17 Commercial Banks) 
 
Variable Coefficient Estimates 
Sovereign risk 2.177** 
(2.181) 
Economic growth 37.106*** 
(2.695) 
Inflation -0.377** 
(-2.068) 
Debt interest rate 1.679*** 
(3.299) 
Profit per share 1.445 
(0.554) 
Non-performing loan rate -0.087** 
(-2.008) 
Capital adequacy ratio -0.362 
(-0.607) 
Bank ownership 3.675 
(1.042) 
Market share 0.068 
(0.160) 
Year -0.276 
(-0.955) 
Number of observations 150 
LR statistic 31.69 
Prob (LR statistic) 0.000*** 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below the estimates. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. LR-statistic presents the joint significance of 
the sovereign risk model. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table F showed similar coefficients of the bank risk model results in Table 4.5. 
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However, bank ownership and market share showed insignificant impact on bank risk 
in China, which suggests that the bank size and type do not have a significant impact 
on bank risk; this is not the reality. Adding a new variable – market share to control 
the bank size may lead both market share and bank ownership insignificant in the 
model because state-owned commercial banks are large-sized commercial banks and 
non-state-owned commercial banks are middle- and small- sized commercial banks in 
China: 5 state-owned commercial banks of China occupies approximately 75% of the 
market share in China during our study period (2006-2014). Thus, a potential 
multicollinearity problem between bank size and bank type may contribute to the 
insignificant impact of bank ownership and market share variables in the model. 
Exclude market share from the bank risk model will solve the problem and make the 
bank ownership significant in the model; however, it can also create bias from bank 
size in the bank risk model. 
